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Arbitral Autonomy 
L. Ali Khan∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article presents concrete proposals to amend the current 
arbitration law for minimizing court intervention into arbitration 
proceedings and enforcement of arbitral awards. As a method of 
dispute resolution, arbitration offers an alternative to litigation. Yet 
arbitration is frequently interspersed with litigation. As a true 
alternative, arbitration can and should be autonomous, that is, 
litigation free. Arbitral autonomy fails when parties go to court to 
challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement, to obtain 
emergency relief, or to contest enforceability of the award, among 
other reasons. To accomplish litigation-free arbitration, first, the 
need to go to court must be minimized; second, the desire to go to 
court must be deterred. In developing arbitral autonomy, this Article 
offers theoretically defensible and practically feasible proposals to 
remove both the need and the desire to go to court. In endorsing 
arbitral autonomy, however, this Article warns against an 
arbitration blackout that thrives on secrecy, quasi-lawlessness, and 
pro-arbitration judicial exuberance—a blackout that hurts weak and 
vulnerable parties drawn into mandatory arbitration. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Abstract ................................................................................1 
I. Introduction ..........................................................................2 
II. Forfeiting Litigation .............................................................8 
A. Right to Litigation ........................................................8 
B. Foregoing Litigation Rights ........................................12 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by L. ALI KHAN. 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Washburn University. I am grateful to a number of 
colleagues for making instructive comments when I presented the thesis of this 
Article at a faculty development workshop in 2011. Freddy Sourgens and Patricia 
Judd offered useful suggestions to improve the thesis of the Article. I also wish to 
thank scores of students who, while studying arbitration law with me, reacted to 
and commented on the ideas that would over the years develop into the concept of 
arbitral autonomy. This Article is dedicated to Syed Maqbool Alam and Tanvir 
Ahmed Khan, friends who died long before death was due.  
2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
III. Attributes of Arbitral Autonomy .......................................14 
IV. Autonomy and Arbitrability................................................17 
A. State Non-arbitrability ................................................18 
B. Party Non-arbitrability ................................................23 
 1. Prohibiting Fractional Arbitration ....................... 24 
 2. Arbitrating Fractional Arbitration ....................... 25 
V. Severability Doctrine ..........................................................28 
A. Existence and Enforceability ......................................31 
B. Revisiting Volt ............................................................33 
VI. Parity Principle ...................................................................35 
A. Preliminary Relief .......................................................36 
B. Emergency Relief .......................................................38 
C. Exemplary Relief ........................................................39 
VII. Vacating Arbitration Awards ..............................................42 
VIII. Arbitration Blackout ...........................................................46 
A. Arbitration Secrecy .....................................................49 
B. Quasi-lawlessness .......................................................51 
C. Reasonless Awards .....................................................52 
D. Pro-arbitration Exuberance .........................................55 
IX. Conclusion ..........................................................................57 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, the Connecticut Supreme Court offered an insightful 
paradigm: “Arbitration is a contractual remedy designed to expedite 
informal dispute resolution. Its autonomy requires a minimum of 
judicial intrusion.”1 Although other jurisdictions rarely cite the 
Connecticut court’s words,2 the autonomy of arbitration, as a 
guiding paradigm for restraining judicial intrusion, is a topic in need 
                                                                                                             
 1. State v. Conn. Emps. Union Indep., 440 A.2d 229, 230 (Conn. 1981) 
(citations omitted). 
 2. As of February 14, 2013, the Westlaw “all cases” database revealed only 
seven cases, all in Connecticut, which repeat this formulation of the autonomy of 
arbitration. 
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of scholarly attention. Autonomous arbitration occurs when it is 
initiated, conducted, and concluded, and the arbitration award is 
enforced, all without any need or desire for judicial intervention.3 
Endorsing the autonomy paradigm in its own words, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has affirmed “the unmistakably clear congressional 
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties 
to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in 
the courts.”4 Derived from the contract theory of arbitration,5 
arbitration statutes, court rulings, and arbitrational institutional rules, 
the autonomy paradigm proposed in this Article offers concrete 
suggestions for minimizing court intervention in arbitration 
processes and outcomes. If these proposals aimed at transforming 
the technical infrastructure of arbitration law6 are adopted, 
arbitration will undergo a revolutionary change, developing into a 
complete alternative to litigation. In presenting these proposals, this 
Article invites scholars, lawyers, and judges to further refine the 
concept of arbitral autonomy (or the “autonomy paradigm”)7 that is 
framed in this Article. 
The autonomy paradigm does not advocate that arbitration, as a 
method of dispute resolution, is inherently superior to litigation. 
Rather, litigation conducted in public courts is critical for clarifying 
cases and statutes for future guidance. Arbitration cannot supplant 
litigation. In the past few decades, however, arbitration has gone 
well beyond commercial dispute resolution; it has proliferated in 
numerous areas of law reserved for litigation, including antitrust 
laws and statutory rights. The historical common law prejudice 
against pre-dispute arbitration clauses has waned, expanding the 
scope of arbitration.8 Courts burdened with cases are eager to 
                                                                                                             
 3. Developments in the Law — The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1851, 1862−63 (2000) (stating that courts and commentators are conflicted 
over the efficiency benefits and fairness concerns of arbitration). 
 4. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
(1967). 
 5. The contract theory of arbitration, as explained in this Article, states that 
arbitration is a creature of contract. Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution 
that parties choose by means of a contract. Under the contract theory, therefore, 
arbitration cannot be imposed on a party without the party’s consent. 
 6. Unless otherwise indicated, “arbitration law” refers to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, the Uniform Arbitration Act, state and federal cases decided 
under these statutes, and common law. Even though this Article is confined to the 
United States, the principles discussed may have universal appeal and application.  
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000), 1 U.L.A. 1 
(2009). 
 7. This Article uses “arbitral autonomy” and “autonomy paradigm” as 
synonymous concepts. 
 8. Common law was averse to enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
but was wholly willing to enforce post-dispute arbitration agreements. In the 19th 
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uphold arbitration agreements to lighten their dockets.9 Even 
lawmakers facing budget rationing have little interest in opposing 
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution because 
litigation costs money to the public treasury.10 
Unfortunately, arbitration as currently practiced does not free up 
judicial resources, nor does arbitration necessarily lead to arbitral 
autonomy. Arbitration law has left open numerous escape routes for 
parties to resort to litigation. Parties may choose arbitration by 
means of an agreement, either before or after disputes arise.11 In 
most cases, the agreement obligates parties to settle either specific or 
all disputes by arbitration. By choosing arbitration, obligated 
parties12 give up the right to litigate disputes identified in the 
arbitration agreement. In reality, however, arbitration parties may 
not completely abandon litigation and their arbitration may be 
interspersed with litigated disputes, a phenomenon that may be 
                                                                                                             
 
century, courts would not enforce the arbitration agreement if a party changed its 
mind after the dispute arose. Justice Story opined that a “reluctant party” cannot be 
forced to submit to arbitration and surrender access to common courts of justice. 
Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320−21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). 
 9. Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” 
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381, 385 (1995) 
(arguing that the “hidden motive” behind the pro-arbitration stance is a judicial 
desire to reduce case load). There are state judges, however, with dissenting voices 
against the invasion of arbitration. In Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 
(Mont. 1994), for example, Justice Trieweiler took issue with “those federal 
judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their ‘heavy case loads’ 
and who consider the reluctance of state courts to buy into the arbitration program 
as a sign of intellectual inadequacy.” Id. at 939 (Trieweiler, J., concurring). 
 10. Harry Arkin, Dispute Resolution A Comparative Analysis under Differing 
Legal Systems, 39A ROCKY. MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1995). (“[I]n litigation, the 
taxpayers, not the disputing parties, pay for the Courts, (i.e. the rent for the Court 
Room, salaries of the Judges, their clerks, and their administrators.)”). Since 1961, 
the volume of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation has exploded more than one hundredfold, 
resulting in substantial costs to taxpayers. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SWORD & 
SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 142 
(Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3rd ed. 2006). 
 11. Arbitration law no longer requires that the arbitration agreement be in 
writing and signed. Responding to the electronic age of emails, faxes, videos, and 
audios, the law now requires that there be an authenticated record rather than a 
signed writing. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1(6) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 11 
(2009). 
 12. An “obligated party” means a party that has agreed by means of an 
arbitration agreement to settle selected disputes by means of arbitration. 
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called “arbitral litigation.”13 The autonomy paradigm is designed to 
minimize, if not to completely eliminate, arbitral litigation. 
In arbitral litigation, a “renegade party” is one who undercuts the 
arbitration agreement and revivifies litigation. The renegade party 
may resort to arbitral litigation for a host of reasons at various stages 
of arbitration. For example, the renegade party may refuse to submit 
to arbitration, challenging the existence of the arbitration agreement. 
It may contest the arbitrability of issues submitted to arbitration. The 
renegade party may litigate to seek preliminary relief for the 
preservation of assets. If arbitration proceedings are successfully 
completed, the renegade party may petition the court to vacate the 
arbitration award.14 Because the definition of award includes certain 
arbitral decisions delivered during the arbitration proceedings, a 
party may litigate to vacate such decisions. 
As an overarching principle, the autonomy paradigm proposes 
that state and federal courts summarily reject challenges to all facets 
of arbitration. This rejection is necessary because law rarely 
precludes the filing of petitions, including frivolous and meritless 
petitions. Arbitral autonomy can be activated, and judicial 
intervention denied, as soon as parties choose arbitration to settle 
disputes between them. A policy opposing arbitral litigation sends a 
forceful systemic message that parties should deliberate before 
committing disputes to arbitration because renegade parties will not 
be allowed to perforate arbitral autonomy. Arbitral autonomy is 
further garrisoned when arbitration organizations15 provide effective 
mechanisms to redress meritorious grievances emanating from 
arbitration processes and outcomes, thus eliminating the need to go 
to court.16 
To understand the autonomy paradigm, de jure autonomy must 
be distinguished from de facto autonomy. Generally, parties are free 
to conduct and conclude arbitration without any court assistance. De 
                                                                                                             
 13. “Arbitral litigation” occurs when an arbitration party approaches the court 
to contest some aspect of arbitration. Arbitral litigation tends to undermine 
arbitration as a true alternative to litigation. 
 14. Arbitration law allows judicial relief against the enforcement of 
arbitration awards for a host of reasons. 
 15. An “arbitration organization” is “an association, agency, board, 
commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers an 
arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.” UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 1(1)  (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 11 (2009). 
 16. For example, parties should be able to remove partial arbitrators without 
going to court. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 
AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES § R-17, at 21 (2009), available at http://www 
.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestrele
ased (allowing disqualification of an arbitrator for partiality or lack of 
independence). 
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facto autonomy occurs when all stages of arbitration proceedings are 
successfully concluded and the award is enforced without court 
intervention. However, when a renegade party seeks court 
intervention at any stage of arbitration, de facto autonomy ceases to 
exist. Going beyond de facto autonomy, the autonomy paradigm 
promotes de jure autonomy. Synonymous with de jure autonomy, 
the autonomy paradigm requires that arbitration law effectively 
close escape routes to arbitral litigation so that renegade parties have 
little incentive to, and might even face penalties if, they seek court 
intervention to oppose the arbitration agreement, the arbitration 
proceedings, or the arbitration award. 
Jurisprudentially, the legal system has not yet fully recognized 
that arbitral autonomy offers numerous benefits. In fact, the benefits 
of arbitration publicized in legal literature should be associated with 
arbitral autonomy and not with arbitration littered with litigation.17 
For example, arbitral autonomy makes arbitration a more complete 
alternative to litigation as autonomy disconnects arbitration from 
litigation. By disconnecting litigation, arbitral autonomy gives 
parties the confidence to recruit specialists to resolve complex 
disputes18 beyond the expertise of state and federal judges.19 
Additionally, cost, efficiency, speed, and the need for confidentiality 
make arbitral autonomy much more attractive than arbitration 
punctuated with litigation. For resolving international disputes, 
parties belonging to different legal systems and traditions may have 
                                                                                                             
 17. The advantages of arbitration are listed as following: (1) speedy resolution 
of disputes in months rather than years; (2) substantial savings in legal fees and 
costs; (3) avoidance of excessive jury verdicts; (4) avoidance of elected state court 
judges who favor the plaintiffs’ bar; (5) reduced punitive damages claims; (6) 
uniformity of arbitration law and procedures; (7) reduced class action lawsuits; (8) 
limited discovery; and (9) limited right to appeal. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Ballard 
Spahr, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Contracts, 
1946 PLI/CORP 201, 207−08 (2012). 
 18. For example, disputes arising out of software, structural engineering, 
patents, and similar sciences and technology require sophisticated knowledge of 
the relevant field. Experts in the relevant field can be much more effective judges 
than lay judges. In many such disputes, the knowledge of sciences may be much 
more relevant than the knowledge of law for an efficacious and fair dispute 
resolution. See Stuart M. Boyarsky, Not What They Bargained For: Directing the 
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 221, 
226 (2013) (stating that arbitrators as experts in the industry can apply the law of 
the shop.). 
 19. Arbitrators may be former state judges, experts, academics, lawyers, 
indeed any person that the parties consider to be qualified to resolve the dispute. 
Unlike state judges, formally educated in law with considerable law practice 
experience, arbitrators may have expertise in areas other than law. See McDonald 
v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (noting that many 
arbitrators are not lawyers and may not have expertise in the law of the land). 
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little confidence in or familiarity with each other’s court system; 
hence, they seek arbitration fortified with autonomy.20 Most 
businesses, averse to negative publicity, would prefer autonomous 
arbitration over arbitration conducted under the Damoclean sword of 
litigation.21 
The autonomy paradigm makes several technical proposals 
dispersed at appropriate places throughout this Article. These 
proposals expand the arbitrator’s22 authority necessary to foreclose 
corresponding litigation. Most importantly, the paradigm empowers 
the arbitrator to decide whether an arbitration agreement exists and 
is enforceable and whether a specific dispute falls within the scope 
of an arbitration agreement. Further, the autonomy paradigm confers 
upon the arbitrator severability power, that is, the authority to sever 
the arbitration agreement from the underlying contract. If the 
arbitration agreement is enforceable, arbitration proceeds to settle 
the issues, including voidability of the underlying contract. 
Additionally, arbitral autonomy empowers the arbitrator to grant 
preliminary, emergency, and exemplary relief without any court 
assistance. Likewise, the need to go to court is foreclosed when a 
private appellate avenue is available to review the arbitration award. 
Accordingly, the autonomy paradigm endorses private review of 
arbitration awards. 
This Article sets forth the argument for arbitral autonomy in the 
following sequence. Part II examines the contract theory of 
arbitration, emphasizing that parties forfeit the right to litigation 
when they select arbitration. Part III discusses the primary attributes 
of arbitral autonomy. Part IV examines issues of non-arbitrability, 
proposing ways to avoid fractional arbitration that leads to litigation. 
Part V argues that the severability doctrine, under which the validity 
of an arbitration agreement is analyzed separately from that of the 
underlying contract, fortifies arbitral autonomy. Part VI presents the 
parity principle under which arbitrators are granted powers equal to 
those of trial judges. This parity expedites the arbitration process 
                                                                                                             
 20. Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 775, 827−28 (2012). “[A]lthough consensual as a formal matter, accepting 
arbitration is, in many circumstances, effectively mandatory for states that wish to 
do business with foreign private parties.” Id. at 829. 
 21. One might argue that parties choose arbitration knowing that if arbitration 
goes wrong, the safety net of litigation is available; consequently, arbitral 
autonomy might stifle arbitration. (Professor Patricia Judd made this argument 
while reviewing this Article.) Whether arbitral autonomy would indeed chill 
arbitration is an empirical question that cannot be answered via speculation. In any 
event, arbitral autonomy makes arbitration a more authentic and measured method 
of dispute resolution. 
 22. This Article uses the phrase “the arbitrator” to include an arbitration panel 
of two, three, or more. 
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and eliminates the need to go to court to seek procedural, 
emergency, or substantive relief. Part VII makes proposals to avoid 
arbitral litigation in the enforcement of arbitration awards. Part VIII 
defines the limits of the autonomy paradigm. The discussion warns 
against any sightless enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses 
(MACs) forced upon consumers and employees. This discussion 
strengthens the argument for arbitral autonomy. 
II. FORFEITING LITIGATION 
The autonomy paradigm postulates that parties definitively 
forfeit the right to litigation when they establish contractual 
arbitration. As discussed below, the autonomy paradigm respects the 
right to litigation that parties enjoy in the absence of an arbitration 
agreement. In most legal systems, state-supported courts are 
available to settle disputes. Access to courts establishes a systemic 
right to litigation. This right to litigation, however, may be 
surrendered in favor of arbitration by means of an agreement. Below 
is a brief overview of the right to litigation. 
A. Right to Litigation 
One might argue that a general right to litigate civil disputes has 
not been identified as a constitutional or human right.23 Even so, a 
right to access courts has been recognized since the early 19th 
century.24 The right permeates both criminal and civil cases.25 In 
criminal cases, the defendant is armed with a series of constitutional 
and human rights to contest charges. The presumption of innocence 
is the cardinal principle promised to protect defendants in criminal 
cases.26 The right to litigation is protected even in civil cases where 
                                                                                                             
 23. The author has been unable to find a constitutional or treaty text that 
proclaims “a right to litigation.” However, the absence of these specific words in 
constitutions and treaties does not prove that there is no right to litigation. For 
example, the right to litigation may be phrased as a right to a judicial forum. See, 
e.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) (recognizing 
employees’ rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment 
discrimination). 
 24. See Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: 
Reconsidering the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 
863, 888 (2011). 
 25. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial 
Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 379−80 (2010) (suggesting 
that the Due Process clause and the First Amendment Right to Petition are the 
sources of the right to access to courts in both criminal and civil cases). 
 26. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding that the 
presumption of innocence is axiomatic and elementary); Estelle v. Williams, 425 
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the state itself engages in unlawful activity.27 For example, the right 
to litigation is available if the state appropriates private property 
without just and prompt compensation. Likewise, the right to 
litigation is protected to enforce the right to free speech, the right to 
freedom of religion, and, indeed, a complex set of civil, political, 
and economic rights. In most legal systems, the people enjoy a right 
to litigate civil disputes against state actors and instrumentalities, a 
right available to both natural and juridical persons. This right to 
litigation allows individuals and businesses to use state-administered 
resources, including courts and agencies, to obtain legal and 
equitable reliefs. 
The right to litigation against non-state entities, including natural 
persons and businesses, is a bit more complex in its underpinnings. 
While a general, individual-qua-individual right to litigation is rarely 
anchored in constitutional protections, one might argue that state 
dispute resolution services are indispensable for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights against non-state entities. For example, an 
employee victimized on the basis of race or religion has the right to 
seek relief through the courts. Rights against myriad forms of 
discrimination in the private sector would be meaningless if the state 
provided no access to remedial litigation. Litigation to protect 
constitutional and statutory rights against non-state entities, one 
might argue, is so critical that there indeed exists a de facto right to 
litigation.28 A state cannot discharge its obligations to protect 
ordered liberty if it does not provide dispute resolution services at an 
affordable cost.29 
                                                                                                             
 
U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding that the presumption of innocence, though not 
mentioned in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial). 
 27. However, under the Eleventh Amendment, an unconsenting state is 
afforded immunity from suits in federal courts. See Querm v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 
(1979). 
 28. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002). 
These fundamental rights do not exist just for the benefit of individuals 
who have disputes, but for the benefit of all of us. The constitutional 
rights to open courts and jury trial serve to sustain the existence of a core 
social institution and mechanism upon which, it may be said without 
undue grandiosity, our way of life itself depends. 
Id. at 276. 
 29. Id. 
Our constitutional founders wanted the determinations of what is legally 
correct and just in our society, and the enforcement of our criminal and 
civil laws—to occur in a system of open, accountable, affordable, 
publicly supported, and impartial tribunals—tribunals that involve, in the 
case of the jury, members of the general citizenry. 
Id. 
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The right to litigate must be distinguished from the obligation to 
litigate. An aggrieved party, whether an individual or business, 
whose interests have been injured has the right but not the obligation 
to seek remedies through litigation.30 The legal system rarely 
imposes an obligation on aggrieved parties to seek remedies through 
litigation. An aggrieved party may abandon legitimate and 
meritorious claims and decide not to litigate against the offender. 
Further, rational litigants take into account the transaction cost of 
litigation and may not pursue a claim if the cost of litigation exceeds 
the expected benefit.31 
While an aggrieved party has no obligation to litigate, the 
defendant against whom the claim is filed incurs an obligation to 
defend the civil action. A defendant who does not respond to the 
civil action runs the risk of facing a default judgment. Even in 
frivolous and meritless cases, the defendant must litigate to defeat 
the civil action.32 While a plaintiff is free to walk away from 
litigation, the defendant cannot do so. In more complex cases where 
claims are intertwined with counterclaims, a party’s right to litigate 
is also intertwined with the party’s obligation to litigate. 
The right to litigation levies a financial burden on taxpayers. The 
state maintains court buildings, pays salaries to judges and staff, and 
incurs numerous other costs associated with the civil justice system. 
Parties litigating a civil dispute pay court fees, but these are rarely 
sufficient to cover the state expenses of litigation.33 For the most 
                                                                                                             
 30. Institutional plaintiffs, such as corporations, may have structural 
constraints emanating from their charter of organization to pursue legal remedies 
in certain cases. Organized businesses, therefore, may not have the complete 
internal freedom to abandon the right to litigation. Individuals, however, enjoy 
more freedom not to exercise the right to litigation. 
 31. Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 94−95 
(2007) (stating that a patentee, for example, might not sue for patent infringement 
because of the prohibitive cost of litigation, running at $2 million per side). 
 32. In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), Justice Scalia 
made an interesting commentary on this question: 
The books are full of procedural rules that place the perjurer (initially, at 
least) in a better position than the truthful litigant who makes no response 
at all. A defendant who fails to answer a complaint will, on motion, suffer a 
default judgment that a deceitful response could have avoided. A defendant 
whose answer fails to contest critical averments in the complaint will, on 
motion, suffer a judgment on the pleadings that untruthful denials could 
have avoided . . . . And a defendant who fails to submit affidavits creating a 
genuine issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment will 
suffer a dismissal that false affidavits could have avoided. In all of those 
cases . . . perjury may purchase the defendant a chance at the factfinder. 
Id. at 521−22 (citations omitted). 
 33. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional 
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1122−23 (2010) (arguing that court fees should be 
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part, taxpayers rather than litigants bear the cost of judicial and 
administrative services available for the resolution of civil disputes. 
If the law allows litigants to request jury trials, ordinary citizens are 
summoned to invest time and suffer opportunity cost to assist in 
dispute resolution.34 Thus, a systemic right to litigation imposes 
both direct and indirect costs on taxpayers. 
Public expenditures on resolution of civil disputes are 
indispensable for safeguarding ordered liberty. If legal justice is 
unavailable or unaffordable, social order is undermined. The right to 
litigation is meaningless without access to courts. Circuit Judge 
Diana Wood accurately pointed out that “[i]f courts are unavailable 
or unable to function, as was the case following Hurricane Katrina, 
little stands between the citizenry and the breakdown of the rule of 
law.”35 While litigants normally settle their disputes in the shadow 
of the law, the availability of courts makes apparent the coercive 
imminence of law. Law without courts may still furnish a normative 
framework for litigants to articulate and debate issues leading to 
settlement.36 Yet, the availability of courts and the associated public 
expense is a steadying element in the maintenance of social order 
and subsidization of legal justice.37 
The right to litigation, however, safeguards constitutional rights, 
including welfare rights.38 The state is under a moral obligation to 
                                                                                                             
 
increased for foreign litigants accessing U.S. courts to recoup the actual cost of 
litigation). 
 34. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why 
the Definition of Systemic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must be 
Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 796−97 (2011). 
Although courts rarely acknowledge it explicitly, most recognize the jury 
system is heavily subsidized by the in-kind contributions of jurors, their 
employers, and their communities. Only a small portion of the actual 
costs of the jury system are incurred by the courts for administrative 
expenses, juror fees, and mileage reimbursement. Lost income—or 
alternatively, lost wages paid by employers who compensate employees 
while on jury service—averages $100 per day, and a conservative 
estimate of lost productivity by employed jurors is $675 per day. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 35. Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Time of Natural 
Disasters, 51 HOW. L. J. 747, 748 (2008). 
 36. Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L. J. 1269, 1293−94 
(1997). 
 37. Nicholas A. Robinson, Ensuring Access to Justice Through 
Environmental Courts, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 365−66 (2012) (suggesting 
that access to courts for the vindication of environmental rights has attained the 
status of customary international law). 
 38. See David Rudovsky, Civil Rights Litigation: The Current Paradox, 5 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 487 (2003) (explaining that the Pennsylvania University 
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spend public monies to subsidize the right to litigation for the poor 
and middle classes.39 However, the wealthy can pay to exercise the 
right to litigation themselves. There is little moral or pragmatic 
justification for spending public funds to support litigation between 
wealthy individuals or mega-companies, particularly if litigation 
involves disputes of marginal social utility.40 Even in cases where 
substantial public interest is at stake, law can simply require that 
dispute resolution be open and not confidential. Public disclosure of 
a socially crucial case does not further require that public funds be 
spent to resolve the dispute. 
B. Foregoing Litigation Rights 
By choosing arbitration, parties forego several rights 
accompanying litigation. For example, arbitration parties surrender 
the Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial because 
arbitration is conducted without juries.41 More broadly, parties 
surrender the right to access courts. Likewise, parties give up the 
right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws because 
arbitration does not rigidly subscribe to these constitutional rights.42 
Parties also give up the right to discovery under the rules of civil 
procedure, the right to properly filtered evidence under the rules of 
evidence, and the right to appeal legally erroneous decisions.43 All 
of these rights are surrendered to acquire the potential expedition, 
efficiency, informality, and finality of the arbitration process.44 This 
bargain of swapping litigation rights with arbitration advantages is 
defended, if not justified, in the name of freedom of contract.45  
                                                                                                             
 
symposium on Suing the Government highlighted that access to courts is critical 
for vindicating constitutional and other rights, including welfare rights). 
 39. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (2010) 
(proposing an attorney’s fee shifting system under which the poor can successfully 
assert their rights). 
 40. Commentators highlight the cost of litigation and its differential impact of 
the rich and the poor. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and 
Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 162−63 
(1999) (stating that overly permissive discovery rules favor the wealthy and 
disfavor the poor). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 42. See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 17 n.1 (Mont. 2002) 
(Nelson, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Some commentators argue that parties should have the freedom of 
contract to shape procedural rules in litigation as well. See Michael L. Moffitt, 
Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. 
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Further, by choosing arbitration, parties shift the cost of dispute 
resolution from taxpayers to themselves. On a shared basis, parties 
pay all costs related to arbitration. Parties pay arbitration 
organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
that provide critical services and default rules for the initiation, 
continuation, and conclusion of arbitration proceedings.46 Parties 
pay arbitrators for their expertise and time in resolving disputes. 
Parties pay all other expenses related to renting the place for 
arbitration, summoning witnesses, and securing translation services 
and the equipment used in presenting evidence, etc. If the award is 
voluntarily enforced, parties bear the entire cost of arbitration.47 
In employment disputes, however, the autonomy paradigm 
requires that employers, and not low-income employees, pay the 
entire cost of arbitration. The traditional rule under which both 
parties shoulder the cost of litigation need not apply to employment 
disputes.48 The low-income employee may surrender the systemic 
right to litigation if the employer undertakes the full cost of 
arbitration. Otherwise, arbitration would become oppressive as low-
income employees might abandon even meritorious claims to avoid 
the cost of arbitration. The purpose of employment arbitration is not 
to defeat meritorious claims but to provide an alternative means of 
dispute resolution. Employers may offer arbitration as a condition of 
employment in that an applicant who does not agree to arbitrate 
employment disputes may be denied the job. In such cases, arbitral 
autonomy is morally well-founded when low-income employees are 
exempt from sharing the cost of arbitration. 
In sum, arbitral autonomy recognizes that there exists a right to 
litigate civil disputes that parties may forego by means of an 
                                                                                                             
 
WASH. L. REV. 461, 462−63 (2007) (proposing that conventional procedural rules 
should be treated as default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable parameters). 
 46. Arbitration organizations establish bodies that oversee arbitration awards 
and appoint arbitrators. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce has 
instituted the International Court of Arbitration. The London Court of 
International Arbitration and the International Centre of the American Arbitration 
Association discharge similar functions. These entities are not courts; they are 
administrative bodies. 
 47. Arbitration is called private justice partly because parties pay the cost of 
dispute resolution through arbitration. If the public judicial system is not used at 
all, the entire cost of arbitration is borne by the parties. For cost sharing see 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, 
§ R-5-57. 
 48. However, parties may equally share the cost of arbitration if the dispute 
arises between the company and the chief executive officer or other well-paid 
employee. However, equal cost sharing cannot be imposed on clerks, janitors, and 
other low-income employees. 
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arbitration agreement. When parties choose arbitration, they forfeit 
the right to litigation with respect to disputes identified in the 
arbitration agreement. Arbitration law will do no jurisprudential 
harm, and it will be consistent with the contract theory of arbitration 
if it closes all escape routes to litigation for parties who have freely 
chosen arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution. 
III. ATTRIBUTES OF ARBITRAL AUTONOMY  
This Part lays out the attributes of arbitral autonomy. These 
attributes, some of which have gradually evolved to become part of 
arbitration law, minimize arbitral litigation. The autonomy paradigm 
endorses these attributes. However, the paradigm has serious 
reservations about the MACs that harm rather than benefit arbitral 
autonomy. 
First, the most important attribute of arbitral autonomy treats 
arbitration parties with equal respect and concern. This attribute 
acknowledges that no person can be forced to settle disputes through 
arbitration. Parties custom design arbitration by authenticating an 
arbitration agreement that incorporates their mutual will. Party 
autonomy49 is the source of determining issues to be arbitrated, the 
method of selecting the arbitrator, the language in which arbitration 
proceedings will be conducted, the place of arbitration, the choice of 
law that would govern the resolution of substantive disputes, and 
other related matters.50 Equal respect requires that the obligation to 
arbitrate be reciprocal in that each arbitration party is similarly 
bound to submit identified disputes to arbitration. The autonomy 
paradigm rejects asymmetrical arbitration under which one party is 
bound to arbitrate but the other is free to litigate the same disputes—
reaffirming the adage: What is good for the goose is good for the 
gander. 
Second, the autonomy paradigm recognizes the expanding 
universe of arbitration beyond the classical contours of business-to-
business arbitration. Disputes identified in the arbitration agreement 
                                                                                                             
 49. See further discussion of party autonomy in Part III.C. See generally 
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012) (exploring the normative legitimacy of party 
autonomy). 
 50. “Although arbitrators generally enjoy broad powers to resolve disputes, 
there are occasions when an arbitrator’s authority may be unclear, in the absence 
of express agreement of the parties. For this reason, parties may wish to specify, in 
their arbitration agreement, precisely what the arbitrator can and cannot do.” 
STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 86 (2002). For 
efficiency purposes, arbitration parties may adopt the rules of an arbitration 
organization, such as the AAA, that provide the essentials of arbitration. 
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need not be international or commercial in nature. Nor is arbitration 
limited to contractual transactions. Arbitration is available to settle a 
variety of disputes, including the ones arising from torts, labor, 
consumer transactions, employment, and antitrust laws. Claims 
involving statutory rights are not barred from arbitration. “By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, [however,] a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits 
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”51 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that disputes 
involving “the pervasive public interest” are not fit for arbitration.52 
The ever-expanding universe of arbitration excludes fewer and 
fewer claims from its domain.53 
Third, the autonomy paradigm embraces specific performance of 
arbitration agreements and, therefore, compels renegade parties to 
submit to arbitration.54 It is a fundamental principle of contracts that 
parties are free not to enter into a contract, but if they do they are 
obligated to perform the contractual obligations.55 The freedom to 
enter a contract at will does not include the freedom to revoke the 
contract at will. A party breaching the contract is lawfully obliged to 
compensate the aggrieved party.56 In arbitration, however, opting 
out of the arbitration agreement by paying damages is unavailable. 
                                                                                                             
 51. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985). 
 52. Id. at 629. 
 53. See Marmet Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) 
(preempting West Virginia state public policy against pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements that apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death against 
nursing homes). 
 54. Ordinarily, a party may compel arbitration if another party renegades 
against the arbitration agreement and files a civil action. If a party files a civil 
action and the other party does not compel arbitration, the plaintiff may be held to 
have waived the contractual right to arbitration and may be denied the request for 
arbitration. Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (1991). However, the waiver 
is far from automatic. The plaintiff does not surrender the contractual right to 
arbitration by filing a civil action. The defendant must show some sort of injury or 
prejudice for the court to deny plaintiff the exercise of the contractual right to 
arbitration. Catherine McGuire & Robert Love, Dispute Resolution Between 
Investors and Broker–Dealers in the United States Securities Markets, 14 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 449 (1991) (stating that parties may 
approach courts for provisional remedies without waiving the contractual right to 
arbitration). 
 55. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and Reemergence of Legal 
Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1241−42 (1984) (discussing the consensual 
transfer of present or future rights as the basis of contract obligations).  
 56. The breaching party may have to pay compensatory damages. Other 
forms of damages granted are punitive, liquidated, nominal, and restitutionary 
damages. See generally L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance 
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936). 
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Arbitration agreements warrant specific enforcement;57 damages are 
seldom sufficient to opt out of arbitration. Further, arbitration law 
does not allow the revocation of arbitration agreements.58 
Fourth, the autonomy paradigm does not discriminate between 
pre- and post-dispute arbitration agreements, and it enforces both 
types of agreements with equal resolve.59 Historically, post-dispute 
arbitration has been the most accepted form of arbitration because 
parties are fully aware of what is at stake in an existing dispute when 
they surrender the right to litigation in favor of arbitration. Over the 
centuries, common law courts have had little problem enforcing 
post-dispute arbitration agreements. However, common law courts 
have been reluctant to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements on 
the theory that such agreements ought to be revocable after a dispute 
arises if one of the parties no longer believes that arbitration is the 
most appropriate method to resolve the dispute.60 The so-called 
common law hostility was primarily against pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses; it was rarely against post-dispute arbitration agreements.61 
Finally, the autonomy paradigm views MACs inserted in 
consumer and employment contracts with suspicion. MACs pose 
equity threats to the autonomy paradigm.62 The principle that parties 
forfeit the right to litigation and willingly opt for arbitration faces 
distortion in take-it-or-leave-it bargains under which one party 
                                                                                                             
 57. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 
451 (1957) (holding that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes, contained 
in a collective bargaining agreement, should be specifically enforced); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
purpose of FAA was to annul the common law rule against specific enforcement 
of arbitration agreements).  
 58. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (amended 2000). This provision is non-
waivable. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 59. Id. § 6(a). See also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 
220 (1987). 
 60. In the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause regarding a claim under the Securities Act is unenforceable. See Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436−37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 61. See supra note 8. 
 62. MACs may be called coercive. However, the word “coercive” seems 
forceful to describe mandatory arbitration clauses that businesses and employers 
impose on consumers and employees respectively. Ordinarily, the word implies 
the use of force or intimidation to obtain compliance.  The word coercion as 
applied to MACs connotes absence of actual consent, even though formal consent 
might be present, such as initialing the arbitration clauses. See Richard M. 
Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for 
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2001). 
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commands disproportionate market power in relation to the other.63 
MACs are inseparably tied to take-it-or-leave-it bargains. Consumer 
and employment arbitration agreements are in most cases coercive 
contracts. Businesses selling or leasing goods and services include 
binding arbitration as a mandatory condition in sales and lease 
contracts. Consumers have the option to turn down the bargain and 
refuse to buy or lease goods and services from such businesses. But 
if they need to buy goods and services, consumers must submit to 
MACs. Likewise, employers may not offer jobs unless applicants 
accept mandatory arbitration for resolving employment disputes, 
including racial, religious, gender, or other discrimination claims. 
Such take-it-or-leave-it bargains distress the contract theory of 
arbitration, particularly if consumers and employees have no viable 
market option to turn down the bargain. In such cases, to say that 
consumers and employees willingly surrender the right to litigation 
and voluntarily opt for arbitration is a stretched truth. 
In sum, the autonomy paradigm is most suitable for the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements free of procedural coercion 
and substantive unconscionability. If parties negotiate to surrender 
the right to litigation in favor of arbitration and they freely negotiate 
the terms of arbitration, they have little excuse to resort to arbitral 
litigation. The legal system should disallow any weakening or 
undermining of freely negotiated arbitration agreements. The 
autonomy paradigm derives its conceptual clarity and moral vigor 
from freedom of contract. However, the autonomy paradigm does 
not endorse MACs that embody substantive unfairness. Foreclosing 
judicial scrutiny of MACs can entrench market abuse and 
exploitation of the weak and the vulnerable. This point is further 
discussed in Part VIII in the context of arbitration blackout. 
IV. AUTONOMY AND ARBITRABILITY 
This Part explains the relationship between arbitral autonomy and 
arbitrability. For the most part, arbitral autonomy is compatible with 
the concept of “arbitrability,” a permanent feature of arbitration law 
that excludes certain disputes from the scope of arbitration. Non-
arbitrability limits arbitration by the very fact that non-arbitrable 
disputes are reserved for litigation. Arbitral autonomy is relevant only 
if disputes are arbitrable and have been submitted to arbitration. The 
distinction is clear: autonomy suppresses arbitral litigation whereas 
non-arbitrability suppresses arbitration itself. Historically, arbitration 
                                                                                                             
 63. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2011) 
(commenting on the popular jurisprudential postulate that arbitration is based on 
consent, not coercion). 
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has been a favored method for settling commercial disputes while 
non-commercial disputes were reserved for litigation. In the past few 
decades, legislatures and courts have been exceedingly open to 
arbitration, and the historically limited scope of arbitration has 
substantially expanded, reaching employment, consumer, and 
antitrust matters. Fewer and fewer areas of law, civil disputes, and 
specific issues are non-arbitrable. As non-arbitrability shrinks in 
scope, the autonomy paradigm becomes more and more valuable. 
For analytical purposes, non-arbitrability may be divided into 
two distinct categories: state non-arbitrability and party non-
arbitrability. As discussed below, the autonomy paradigm raises 
different issues with respect to these categories. As a general 
principle, with only a few caveats, the autonomy paradigm respects 
state non-arbitrability that excludes certain matters from arbitration; 
it similarly respects party non-arbitrability in that arbitration parties 
may freely identify issues they would submit to arbitration and 
reserve others for litigation. 
A. State Non-arbitrability 
“State non-arbitrability” refers to laws and policies that a state 
may adopt to exclude designated matters from the scope of 
arbitration. “State arbitral paternalism” is a jurisprudential construct 
to defend state-initiated non-arbitrability. State arbitral paternalism 
disallows arbitration, preserves the right to litigation, and 
consequently guides persons to litigate rather than arbitrate certain 
disputes.64 For example, the state has a monopoly over the 
dissolution of marriage.65 Even though parties may negotiate marital 
property settlement and child custody issues, the dissolution of 
                                                                                                             
 64. For example, in the past few years, the controversy over faith-based 
arbitrations has stirred legal and political circles. The Sharia-based arbitration 
intensifies Islamophobia and some legitimate concerns with respect to Western 
values of female equality. See Jean-Francoise Gaudreault-Desbiens, Constitutional 
Values, Faith-Based Arbitrations, and the Limits Private Justice in a Multicultural 
Society, 19 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 155 (2005); see also Liaquat Ali Khan, Kansas 
Legislature Does Harm in Barring Islamic Law, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 
2012, 12:05 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/liaquat-ali-khan/kansas-sharia-law_b 
_1518144.html. 
 65. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (“[W]e know of no 
instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate 
themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and 
more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the 
State’s judicial machinery.”). States also exercise control over the formation of 
marriage; marriage regulations vary from state to state. See generally Adam 
Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
735 (2011). 
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marriage itself is non-arbitrable, and only courts are empowered to 
dissolve marriages. In addition, the court is not bound to accept a 
negotiated settlement, even though most courts defer to the parties. 
The parental abuse of children also warrants state paternalism.66 The 
state monopoly over dissolution of marriages to the exclusion of 
arbitration may be judicious for the protection of children’s rights.67 
As a jurisprudential construct, state arbitral paternalism plays a 
beneficial role in protecting the community’s weak and vulnerable 
sections. In preserving social order, economic justice, or elements of 
fairness, the state may exclude certain legal matters from the private 
justice of arbitration and retain them in the public realm of state 
courts. In modern societies, state arbitral paternalism does not 
emanate from the will of a “philosopher–judge”68 who might see the 
ills of arbitration that no one else does. State choices of non-
arbitrability are frequently democratic choices, made after due 
debate and deliberations in elected chambers and legislated in state 
statutes. To declare all such democratic choices in determining the 
scope of arbitration as “hostility to arbitration” is analytically 
inaccurate and indefensible.69 
State non-arbitrability, however, is undergoing serious judicial 
deconstruction and dismantlement. The state power to freely declare 
non-arbitrability in certain areas of law has been challenged through 
the constitutional doctrine of preemption.70 Both Congress and 
federal courts have flattened the fortress of state non-arbitrability. If 
parties opt for arbitration but the state mandates litigation, federal 
                                                                                                             
 66. For example, the state as parens patriae protects children from neglectful 
parents. However, excessive state paternalism over family matters could harm 
rather than protect children. Coyla J. O’Connor, Childhood Obesity and State 
Intervention: A Call to Order!, 38 STETSON L. REV. 131, 146 (2008). 
 67. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: 
An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 500 
(1981) (arguing that arbitration resolves competing interests of parties (parents) 
and because the child is not an arbitration party, the child’s welfare may not be 
fully represented or protected in the arbitration proceedings). But see Lawrence S. 
Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal 
Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198 (1964) (arguing that a legal instrument like 
arbitration is suitable for disputes involving child welfare). 
 68. Dean Norman Redlich, with whom the author studied a course in Legal 
Education, offered the phrase “philosopher–judge” to describe Judge Edward 
Winfield. See Norman Redlich, Judge Edward Winfield, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 927, 
928 (1987). 
 69. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (protesting that an expanding scope of FAA will 
displace state statutes designed to protect consumers). 
 70.  Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. 
L.J. 393, 409 (2004) (discussing the preemption of state laws that impede the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses). 
20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
courts side with the parties and not the state.71 As a broad principle, 
the contractual right to arbitration trumps state non-arbitrability. 
By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, 
Congress set in motion a process of undermining state non-
arbitrability.72 The FAA protects the specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.73 Courts have employed the FAA to strike 
down state statutes that collide with the specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.74 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
enacting the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring 
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial 
forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed 
to resolve by arbitration.”75 In conflicts over arbitrability between a 
state statute and an arbitration agreement, federal courts enforce the 
arbitration agreement and not the state statute.76 Even when state 
courts favor non-arbitrability, federal courts rely on the FAA to 
overrule state courts and support the specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.77 
Consider a state non-arbitrability statute. The California 
Franchise Investment Law provides: “Any condition, stipulation or 
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to 
waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order 
hereunder is void.”78 In reading this provision, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that claims asserted under the Franchise 
Investment Law are non-arbitrable.79 In others words, parties to a 
franchise agreement cannot surrender their right to litigation in favor 
of arbitration. Parties must litigate and find judicial solutions to 
issues arising under the Franchise Law. The U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down California’s non-arbitrability statute as an unlawful 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490−91 (1987). 
 72. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 73. Id. §§ 9–11. The reluctant party that agreed to arbitrate can be compelled 
to abide by the agreement. 
 74. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (preempting the 
Montana statute that makes arbitration agreements unenforceable unless the notice 
that the contract was subject to arbitration was underlined in capital letters on the 
first page of the contract).  
 75. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 76. Marmet Healthcare Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (holding that 
FAA preempts West Virginia statute that excludes from arbitrability pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses for claims involving injury and wrongful death caused by 
negligence in nursing homes); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that 
FAA preempts state-law requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for 
wage disputes). 
 77. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 78. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 2011). 
 79. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982). 
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barrier to the scope of arbitration.80 It preempted the statute and 
upheld the freedom of parties to arbitrate franchise disputes.81 
Under the evolving law of arbitrability, private contracts can 
preempt state statutes that bar arbitration. Parties may use an 
arbitration agreement to defeat state non-arbitrability. If a certain 
matter is non-arbitrable under state law, parties may nonetheless 
agree to submit such non-arbitrable matter to arbitration. They count 
on the FAA’s supportive role to defeat the state barrier. That 
arbitration parties may use the power of contract to defeat state non-
arbitrability is a remarkable triumph of private law over legislative 
policies. 
It is unclear, however, whether federal courts would remove 
every conceivable state arbitral barrier under the preemption 
doctrine. Parties take some risk when they defy state non-
arbitrability laws and agree to submit matters to arbitration. In most 
cases, state non-arbitrability is a non-issue if both parties are 
committed to arbitration. State non-arbitrability becomes an issue 
only when a renegade party challenges the arbitration agreement on 
the basis of a state statute prohibiting arbitration. In such cases, 
federal courts are disinclined to rescue the renegade party; they 
uphold the arbitration agreement and not the state barrier. 
The autonomy paradigm does not advocate that all state barriers 
to arbitration be completely removed. As noted before, the 
autonomy paradigm aims to eliminate arbitral litigation; it does not 
prefer arbitration over litigation. The state may have weighty policy 
considerations in excluding certain legal matters from the scope of 
arbitration. Some such barriers may survive the law of preemption. 
The autonomy paradigm respects the law of preemption that 
dismantles non-principled state barriers to arbitration, and it also 
respects legitimate state concerns for reserving certain matters 
exclusively for judicial forums. 
In addition to dismantling state non-arbitrability, federal courts 
are equally resolved to dismantle federal non-arbitrability. The 
Supreme Court has interpreted federal statutes granting the right to 
sue to include the option to arbitrate.82 The theory that Congress can 
grant a non-waivable right to sue is still good.83 However, unless the 
language of the federal statute is crystal clear in excluding 
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, the right to sue is 
                                                                                                             
 80. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 81. Id. 
 82. CompuCredit Corp.  v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
 83. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985). 
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interpreted to include the right to arbitration. Even “repeated use of 
the terms ‘action,’ ‘class action,’ and ‘court’—terms that . . . call to 
mind a judicial proceeding” in a federal statute will not be construed 
to conclude that the statute requires litigation and prohibits 
arbitration.84 The powerful pro-arbitration trend in federal courts 
rarely rules in favor of non-arbitrability. 
Should the arbitrator have the preemption power to strike down 
a state statute prohibiting arbitration? The autonomy paradigm is 
greatly strengthened if arbitrators can lawfully exercise this 
preemption power and thereby eliminate the need to go to court. To 
understand this proposition, consider the franchise case discussed 
above.85 The California statute excludes franchise-related matters 
from the scope of arbitration, requiring litigation. Imagine that 
parties enter into a franchise agreement that includes an arbitration 
clause to settle franchise disputes, ignoring the state statute. When a 
dispute arises, one party requests arbitration while the other objects 
to arbitration by pleading the state non-arbitrability statute. 
If the arbitrator is empowered to decide the non-arbitrability 
question, the arbitrator may uphold the California statute and 
conclude that the dispute is non-arbitrable. In that case, arbitration 
will no longer be available unless the court decides otherwise and 
preempts the state non-arbitrability statute. A more serious situation 
arises if the arbitrator believes that the California statute is an 
unlawful barrier to arbitration. Should the arbitrator be granted the 
preemption power to decide that the California statute is an unlawful 
barrier to arbitration under the combined impact of party autonomy 
and federal law? 
The judicial power of preemption is a sensitive constitutional 
question impinging upon state sovereignty. Granting the preemption 
power to arbitrators is a non-starter because it will invite stiff 
opposition from judges, lawmakers, and other legal professionals. 
Numerous arguments may be summoned against granting 
preemption power to arbitrators. First, because even non-lawyers 
can be arbitrators, they might lack the expertise and understanding 
of the application of preemption law. Second, arbitrators and judges 
might reach conflicting conclusions on preemption, creating 
systemic confusion and potentially increasing arbitral litigation. 
Third, because arbitration awards cannot be set aside for legal or 
interpretive errors, judges would have little power to overrule 
erroneous interpretations of preemption law in arbitration circles. 
Fourth, constitutional matters, such as preemption, should not be 
privatized because no private person ought to have the power to 
                                                                                                             
 84. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670. 
 85. See supra notes 78–81 and corresponding text. 
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nullify a state statute. On the basis of these and other arguments, the 
autonomy paradigm does not propose to disturb the exclusive 
judicial preemption power to strike down state non-arbitrability 
statutes. 
B. Party Non-arbitrability 
“Party autonomy” empowers arbitration parties to determine the 
scope of the arbitration agreement. “Party non-arbitrability” is the 
subpart of a broader concept of party autonomy to make and shape 
bargains.86 Arbitration law generally respects party autonomy. 
“Through their contracts, parties determine the arbitrators’ 
substantive and procedural powers. Arbitrators who comply with the 
resulting substantive and procedural limits demonstrate deference to 
the parties and reinforce the parties’ autonomy.”87 Exercising party 
autonomy, parties to an arbitration agreement may exclude certain 
matters from arbitration.88 The law does not obligate parties to 
accept arbitration for all disputes between them. Parties are free to 
hybridize dispute resolution by choosing arbitration for some 
disputes and reserving litigation for others, a phenomenon that this 
Article calls “fractional arbitration.” The mere existence of an 
arbitration agreement does not automatically determine that every 
dispute between the parties is subject to arbitration. 
Arbitral autonomy disapproves of asymmetrical arbitration 
agreements that retain the right to litigation for one party but not for 
the other. Asymmetrical clauses rarely emanate from genuine party 
autonomy. In most cases, the stronger party, such as an employer, 
imposes an asymmetrical arbitration obligation on the weaker party, 
such as an employee.89 Employment contracts at nonunion 
                                                                                                             
 86. In conflict of laws, party autonomy empowers parties “to select the law 
governing their contract, subject to certain limitations.” Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 491 (1989) (quoting 
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER H. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 632–33 (2d ed. 1991)). 
Here, the concept of party autonomy is used with a broader meaning to include the 
power to make legally enforceable bargains. 
 87. Julia Rabich, Sarah Stoner & Nancy A. Welsh, Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards and Mediation Agreements: Tips for Sustaining Deference, 
67-APR DISP. RESOL. J. 48, 50 (2012). 
 88. “Party autonomy” refers to issues that arbitration parties decide to submit 
to arbitration. It also includes issues that parties reserve for litigation. By contrast, 
“autonomous arbitration” minimizes court intervention with respect to issues 
submitted to arbitration. Autonomous arbitration has no bearing on issues reserved 
for arbitration. 
 89. “[T]he doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which a stronger 
party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbitration forum on the 
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workplaces may contain arbitration clauses with asymmetrical 
obligations. The clause may bind workers but not the employer to 
submit employment disputes to arbitration. Under such one-sided 
clauses, the employer does not surrender the right to litigation in 
favor of arbitration, but the employee does. Courts have refused to 
enforce asymmetrical clauses by declaring them unconscionable.90 
1. Prohibiting Fractional Arbitration 
Ordinarily, parties select arbitration as the exclusive method of 
settling all issues arising out of a transaction. A standard arbitration 
clause may read as follows: “Any controversy or claim arising out 
of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled 
by arbitration.”91 This all-inclusive pre-dispute clause submits all 
contract controversies and claims to arbitration and reserves nothing 
for litigation. A similar all-inclusive pre-dispute agreement may be 
drafted to settle non-contractual claims and controversies by 
arbitration. Despite this common practice of using all-inclusive 
arbitration clauses, arbitration law respects fractional arbitration and 
allows parties to reserve some matters for litigation. 
Analytically, there are two distinct questions: “(1) whether a 
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the 
agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”92 These two questions 
constitute party non-arbitrability. The first question identifies 
whether parties have selected arbitration as the forum for dispute 
resolution. The second question identifies whether the parties have 
selected arbitration for less than all disputes and have thus opted for 
fractional arbitration. Party non-arbitrability is rarely an issue when 
parties submit all disputes to arbitration by means of a valid 
arbitration agreement. 
Fractional arbitration, though sound under the contract theory of 
arbitration, spawns arbitral litigation. When parties establish a 
hybrid regime reserving some issues for arbitration and some for 
litigation, they invite confusion and conflict. Parties will inevitably 
fight over the borderline that separates arbitration issues from 
litigation issues. This border dispute is even more troublesome if 
issues reserved for litigation arise under the same contract or relate 
                                                                                                             
 
weaker party without accepting that forum for itself.” Armendariz v. Found. 
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000). 
 90. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 91. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra 
note 16, § R-34, at 22. 
 92. Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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to the same transaction. Parties will use courts to delineate the 
border that the arbitration agreement might have vaguely drawn. 
Because fractional arbitration breeds arbitral litigation, it clashes 
with the rationale of the autonomy paradigm. 
Arbitral autonomy proposes to prohibit fractional arbitration. 
This prohibition makes much more sense with respect to pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements when the nature and scope of future disputes 
is unknown. Parties are most likely to disagree over the scope of a 
pre-dispute arbitration agreement because parties may see arbitration 
differently when a specific dispute arises. (A post-dispute arbitration 
agreement under which a particular dispute is submitted to 
arbitration does not fall under the concept of fractional arbitration.) 
Arbitration institutions may fashion rules to curb pre-dispute 
fractional arbitration. They already do by proposing broad, 
comprehensive pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The courts may also 
refuse to fine comb an arbitration agreement to determine whether a 
dispute is excluded from arbitration.93 
2. Arbitrating Fractional Arbitration 
Until the law prohibits fractional arbitration, the autonomy 
paradigm supports allowing the arbitrator to decide disputes 
involving party non-arbitrability. While state non-arbitrability 
barriers to arbitration may be reserved exclusively for courts, party 
arbitral choices should be subjected to arbitration. In fractional 
arbitration, if both parties agree that a certain dispute should not be 
submitted to arbitration and must be litigated, the autonomy 
paradigm is not in question. If parties disagree over whether a 
dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, a scenario 
that usually occurs after a dispute has arisen, the road to arbitration 
is no longer clear. If parties agree that the issue of party non-
arbitrability may be submitted to arbitration, they may do so and 
thus preserve the autonomy of arbitration. If parties disagree over 
the party non-arbitrability of an issue and one party calls for 
arbitration and the other for litigation, the deadlock invites arbitral 
litigation and consequently threatens the autonomy paradigm. 
To resolve such deadlocks arising from fractional arbitration 
agreements, the autonomy paradigm confers upon the arbitrator the 
                                                                                                             
 93. “Where the arbitration clause is broad, only an express provision 
excluding a specific dispute, or ‘the most forceful evidence of a purpose to 
exclude the claim from arbitration,’ will remove the dispute from consideration by 
the arbitrators.” Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health 
Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting AT & T Technologies, Inc. 
v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)). 
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inherent power to decide whether a particular controversy is 
arbitrable under the arbitration agreement.94 The arbitrator’s power 
to decide fractional arbitration controversies would eliminate the 
need for the parties to go to court. A fractional arbitration agreement 
is essentially a contract that does not raise intricate constitutional or 
statutory questions. Reserving fractional arbitration questions for 
arbitrators promotes efficiency of dispute resolution. It makes little 
sense to reserve fractional arbitration disputes exclusively for courts 
because, in that case, parties will be forced to litigate such disputes, 
a consequence leading to arbitral litigation that the autonomy 
paradigm strives to eliminate. 
The contract theory of arbitration may be invoked to argue that 
fractional arbitration disputes must be litigated in courts. 
Conceptually, arbitration occurs because parties have voluntarily 
agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. If a certain dispute falls 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the renegade party 
may be compelled to arbitrate because such compulsion is consistent 
with specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. However, if a 
party has not agreed to submit a specific dispute to arbitration, the 
law cannot compel the party to arbitrate that specific dispute. A 
party contesting the arbitrability of a specific dispute is not a 
renegade party but instead a non-party that has not agreed to settle 
the specific dispute by arbitration. On the basis of this contract-
based logic, a party contesting fractional arbitrability makes a 
credible claim against what it believes to be coercive arbitration. 
Arbitration law offers a multilayered solution. First, it draws a 
distinction between procedural and substantive arbitrability. The 
arbitrator has the power to decide issues of procedural arbitrability, 
what arbitration law calls “a condition precedent to arbitrability,”95 
such as time limits, laches, notice, estoppel, and other objections to 
the maintenance of a claim. Substantive arbitrability is indeed 
another name for fractional arbitration. With respect to fractional 
arbitration, that is, whether a dispute is encompassed by an 
agreement to arbitrate, arbitration law provides that the court shall 
decide such a controversy.96 The Supreme Court has upheld the 
judicialization of fractional arbitration.97 This solution is consistent 
                                                                                                             
 94. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that parties may arbitrate the 
“‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.” Rent-A-
Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010). 
 95. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) (amended 2000). 
 96. Id. § 6(b). 
 97. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
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with the contract theory of arbitration that forbids coercive 
arbitration.98 
The judicialization of fractional arbitration, however, is not a 
mandatory rule. It is a default rule that parties may alter to preserve 
arbitral autonomy.99 The parties may include a specific clause in the 
arbitration agreement empowering the arbitrator to decide the 
questions of party non-arbitrability. Some arbitration organizations, 
including the AAA, provide rules under which the arbitrator can 
decide the questions of party non-arbitrability.100 By adopting such 
institutional rules, parties effectively opt out of the existing default 
rule. The courts have upheld institutional rules that empower the 
arbitrator to decide the questions of party non-arbitrability.101 
To keep fractional arbitration out of courts, the autonomy 
paradigm proposes that arbitration law should be amended to 
empower the arbitrator to decide questions of party non-arbitrability. 
There are different ways to amend the law. First, the law can be 
amended to switch the default decision maker from judges to 
arbitrators. Under the new default rule, parties may choose a clause 
                                                                                                             
 98. However, arbitration proceedings are not automatically halted if a party 
files a civil action to contest fractional substantive arbitrability. The arbitration 
proceedings may continue unless the court issues a restraining order or decides 
that the controversy is non-arbitrable. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(d) (amended 
2000). The arbitrator, however, possesses the discretionary power to halt 
arbitration proceedings until the court reaches a decision on fractional arbitration. 
Id. cmt 6.  
 99. Id. § 4(a). This section allows parties to waive the judicialization of 
substantive arbitrability. 
 100. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES, supra note 16, § R-7, at 13. 
(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own 
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope 
or validity of the arbitration agreement. 
(b) The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or 
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. Such an 
arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the 
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract 
is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the 
arbitration clause. 
(c) A party must object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or to the 
arbitrability of a claim or counterclaim no later than the filing of the 
answering statement to the claim or counterclaim that gives rise to the 
objection. The arbitrator may rule on such objections as a preliminary 
matter or as part of the final award. 
Id. 
 101. The Daiei Inc. v. U. S. Shoe Corp., 755 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D. Haw. 1991) 
(noting that parties incorporated by reference in their arbitration agreement the 
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce providing that “any decision as 
to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction shall lie with the arbitrator”). 
28 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
under which judges resolve the questions of party non-arbitrability. 
If parties fail to include such a clause in the arbitration agreement, 
the default rule empowers the arbitrator to decide the questions of 
party non-arbitrability. Second, the law can be amended to take 
courts completely out of party non-arbitrability. Under this option, 
the arbitrator will have the exclusive power to decide the questions 
of party non-arbitrability. This option is most consistent with the 
autonomy paradigm. 
V. SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE 
The autonomy paradigm supports, but reconfigures, the 
severability doctrine under which the arbitration clause is severable 
from the remainder of the underlying contract and enforceable even 
if the remainder of the contract is unenforceable.102 Federal case law 
allows the separation of arbitration clauses “from the contracts in 
which they are embedded.”103 If an underlying contract containing 
an arbitration clause is allegedly induced by fraud, the renegade 
party must separately show that the arbitration clause too is induced 
by fraud. If the arbitration clause is free of fraudulent inducement, 
yet the underlying bargain was allegedly procured by fraud, the 
disputes relating to the fraudulent underlying bargain must be 
resolved through arbitration, not litigation.104 Of course, the 
severability doctrine is irrelevant to cases where the arbitration 
agreement stands alone and is not a part of a larger contract. 
Over the decades, courts have struggled with the enforcement of 
arbitration clauses embedded in void and voidable contracts.105 This 
Article presents two competing models to capture the debate. The 
older model, which may be called the “organic model,” considers 
the contract as an organic whole. Under this model, the contract 
enjoys the unity of existence and enforceability; it is indivisible and 
no part of the contract can be enforced if any part is infected with 
                                                                                                             
 102. The severability doctrine is not free from academic criticism. Professor 
David Horton called the doctrine “the fiction.” See David Horton, The Federal 
Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1033 
(2012). 
 103. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 
(1967). 
 104. Id. at 406. Because arbitrators are compensated corresponding to the 
volume of arbitration they perform, they might have a personal interest in 
prolonging the arbitration and holding that the underlying contract is not void. Id. 
at 416 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 105. A “void” contract produces no legal obligation. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1709 (9th ed. 2009). By contrast, a “voidable” contract creates legal 
obligation but is subject to rescission. Id. at 109–10. Voidable contracts may be 
cured by ratification. Id. 
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illegality. The newer model, which may be called the “mechanical 
model,” considers the contract as a mechanical assembly of 
numerous distinct parts. Under this model, the contract consists of 
many parts; ideally, all parts function together for the best 
performance of the contract. However, if all parts cannot function 
together, good parts may be separated from bad parts. Good parts 
are retained even if bad parts will eventually have to be thrown 
away.106 
When applied to arbitration cases, the organic and mechanical 
models yield dramatically opposite outcomes. Under the organic 
model, if the underlying contract is void, the arbitration clause 
embedded in the contract cannot be enforced. Accordingly, the 
parties must litigate their disputes. Under the mechanical model, the 
problem-free arbitration clause is enforced even if the underlying 
contract is void. This mechanical model, which focuses on the 
legality of the arbitration clause separate and free from the 
underlying contract of which it is a part, is the conceptual 
foundation of the severability doctrine. If the arbitration clause is 
itself legally sound, the contractual obligation to arbitrate is 
enforced, and parties must contest the legality of the underlying 
contract before the arbitrator. 
In order to avoid arbitral litigation, the autonomy paradigm 
subscribes to the mechanical model and not the organic model. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the mechanical model under the 
FAA to liberate arbitration from the doctrinal niceties of state law.107 
In enforcing the mechanical model, the Court has declined to 
entertain any distinctions between void and voidable contracts.108 In 
a rising trend, most states subscribe to the mechanical model even in 
purely domestic cases that involve no interstate commerce.109 A few 
states, however, have refused to follow the mechanical model in 
cases subject to the state arbitration statute.110 Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                             
 106. Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist, uses organic and mechanical 
metaphors in his famous book, The Division of Labor in Society. See EMILE 
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free 
Press 1997) (1893). 
 107. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. 
 108. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006). 
 109. The severability doctrine originated in the jurisprudence of New York 
courts and was initially contested in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pinze v. Jones, 
345 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1976) (favoring severability of the arbitration agreement 
from the underlying contract); see also Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y. 
1973) (showing how New York shifted from nonseverability approach to 
severability doctrine).  
 110. See, e.g., Juan Ramirez, Jr., Arbitrations in Florida: A Tale of Two 
Courts, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 43 (2012) (explaining how state courts are 
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organic model has not been completely discarded even though the 
mechanical model dominates federal and state courts. 
In embracing the mechanical model, the autonomy paradigm 
views a large contract as a series of micro-bargains.111 Specifically, 
the autonomy paradigm views the choice of arbitration as a distinct 
micro-bargain between the parties. If some micro-bargains in the 
contract are legally unenforceable, a legally sound arbitration 
bargain need not be thrown away. Enforcing the arbitration micro-
bargain under the mechanical model allows arbitration to proceed 
even if the entire underlying bargain is allegedly fraudulent or 
unconscionable. 
The mechanical model, however, cannot answer the question of 
whether the arbitrator or the court should have the initial authority to 
separate and enforce the arbitration clause. If only a court can 
separate and enforce the arbitration clause, arbitral litigation is 
inevitable, and consequently arbitral autonomy is punctured. If the 
arbitrator has the primary power to separate and enforce the 
arbitration clause, the parties need not go to court. 112 
In upholding the autonomy paradigm, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that “unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the 
issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the 
first instance.”113 The Court declined to confine its rulings to 
contracts contested in federal courts. The Court declared that 
“regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state 
court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not 
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”114 
This ruling, however, does not answer the more complicated 
question involving arbitration clauses. The following discussion 
grapples with the bifurcated issue of the existence and enforceability 
of an arbitration agreement. 
                                                                                                             
 
pushing back on the severability doctrine in cases where parties have unequal 
bargaining power). 
 111. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 
940−41 (2000) (applying the idea of “series of bargains” to explain the concept of 
the firm). 
 112. See Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What if the 
Bellwether Cases Were Decided by a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 883, 889 (2012). 
 113. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–46. 
 114. Id. at 449. 
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A. Existence and Enforceability 
The mechanical model can separate an arbitration clause from 
the underlying contract, but it cannot sort out conceptual disputes 
buried within the arbitration clause. For example, arbitration law 
maintains a conceptual border between existence and enforceability 
of an arbitration agreement. However, the mechanical model cannot 
safeguard this elusive border; hence arbitral litigation is inevitable. 
Under current law, parties must fight in court to determine if the 
arbitration agreement exists because the law empowers the court to 
decide “whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.”115 By exclusion, 
the arbitrator has no inherent power to decide whether an agreement 
to arbitrate exists. This exclusion, under which no arbitration can 
take place without the existence of an arbitration agreement, 
comports with the contract theory of arbitration. Courts refer to this 
judicial determination as a “gateway matter.”116 If the court decides 
that the arbitration agreement exists, parties are then placed under a 
legal obligation to engage in arbitration to settle enforceability 
issues. Consequently, questions of the arbitration agreement’s 
existence are allocated to courts, while questions of its 
enforceability are allocated to arbitrators.117 
The conceptual border between existence and enforceability of 
an arbitration agreement is problematic and elusive. Problems arise 
because courts are unsure of whether to fuse the formation of an 
arbitration agreement with its fairness. Ordinarily, courts undertake 
to analyze the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and not 
merely the existence of an arbitration agreement.118 When existence 
and validity are fused, judicial approaches are likely to pursue 
divergent paths. For example, a party asserting that an arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable admits existence of the agreement. 
Likewise, a party claiming that the arbitration agreement contains 
ambiguities regarding the award of attorney’s fees is nonetheless 
                                                                                                             
 115. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(b) (amended 2000). 
 116. Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 799, 804 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 117. The FAA provides: “The court shall hear the parties, and upon being 
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply 
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to 
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4 
(2006). 
 118. Arbitration law empowers the arbitrator to decide “whether a contract 
containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.” UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT 
§ 6(c) (amended 2000). Accordingly, the courts must decide whether a valid 
agreement to arbitrate exists. 
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admitting existence of the arbitration agreement.119 Some judges 
would not only consider whether the agreement is free of formation 
flaws, such as coercion, they would also consider whether the 
agreement is valid in light of defenses, such as unconscionability.120 
Others will focus only on formational validity and decline to 
consider fairness defenses to the arbitration agreement.121 This 
divergence spawns arbitral litigation. 
The autonomy paradigm offers two ways to place both existence 
and enforceability issues within the jurisdiction of arbitration. First, 
exercising party autonomy, parties may specifically waive the 
bifurcated stratagem in the arbitration agreement and authorize the 
arbitrator to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.122 
Arbitration law does not prohibit such a waiver.123 Some arbitration 
organizations furnish rules to confer on the arbitrator the power to 
decide “the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration 
agreement”124 making it unnecessary for parties to specifically 
waive the bifurcated stratagem. By incorporating institutional rules 
in the arbitration agreement, parties empower the arbitrator to decide 
all issues related to existence and enforceability of the arbitration 
agreement. 
Second, arbitration law may be amended to construct a new 
gateway rule. Under the new gateway rule, unless parties otherwise 
agree, the arbitrator, and not the court, will have the primary power 
to decide both existence and enforceability issues.125 If the arbitrator 
decides that the arbitration agreement exists and is enforceable, the 
need for arbitral litigation is minimized. If the arbitrator decides that 
the arbitration agreement does not exist or is unenforceable, parties 
are free to litigate disputes in the court without any further 
arbitration proceedings. The new gateway rule, though it supports 
the autonomy paradigm, contaminates the purity of the contract 
theory of arbitration to the extent that there would be cases in which 
arbitration proceedings would be initiated without the existence of a 
valid arbitration agreement. The law might be willing to pay this 
                                                                                                             
 119. See Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
 120. See Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 269 P.3d 914 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 121. Id. at 923  (Wechsler, J., dissenting). 
 122. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4 (a) (amended 2000). 
 123. Id. § 4(b). 
 124. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra 
note 16, § R-7(a), at 13. 
 125. Or, the law may simply discard the elusive distinction between existence 
and enforceability, merge the two concepts, and authorize the arbitrator to declare 
whether the arbitration agreement is binding. 
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minor price in compromising the contract theory of arbitration to 
reap the tangible benefits of arbitral autonomy. 
In sum, the autonomy paradigm endorses the severability 
doctrine to enforce a valid arbitration clause even if the rest of the 
contract is allegedly voidable or void. The arbitrator should decide 
voidability disputes arising from the underlying contract. Further, 
the autonomy paradigm proposes to fuse the existence and 
enforceability issues, empowering the arbitrator to decide whether 
an arbitration agreement exists and is enforceable. This fusion will 
minimize litigation. 
B. Revisiting Volt 
The contract theory of arbitration needs another minor 
adjustment to promote the autonomy paradigm. The autonomy 
paradigm proposes that the choice of law contained in a contract 
should not be used to defeat the arbitration clause embedded in the 
same contract if the two clauses are irreconcilable. The conflict 
arises when the arbitration clause mandates that parties arbitrate a 
dispute while the choice-of-law clause permits the parties to litigate 
the same dispute. If the two clauses are incompatible, the autonomy 
paradigm proposes to enforce the arbitration clause, denying the 
renegade party the choice to litigate. This proposal, however, would 
require that the U.S. Supreme Court revisit Volt Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior 
University.126 
In Volt, the parties included a pre-dispute arbitration clause in 
their underlying construction contract, which mandated that all 
disputes “arising out of or relating to this contract” be submitted to 
arbitration.127 The choice-of-law clause embedded in the form 
construction contract opted for the laws of the place of the 
construction project. When a dispute arose, Stanford, a party to the 
construction contract, sued Volt, the contractor, in a California 
court. Stanford joined two other defendants who were not bound by 
the arbitration agreement. Stanford, the renegade party, relied on the 
choice-of-law clause to resort to litigation instead of arbitration. 
Because the project was located in California, the choice-of-law 
clause triggered the application of the California Civil Procedure 
Code provision that “permits a court to stay arbitration pending 
resolution of related litigation between a party to the arbitration 
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 127. Id. at 470. 
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agreement and third parties not bound by it.”128 Suspending 
arbitration is viewed necessary because simultaneous arbitration and 
litigation raise the “possibility of conflicting rulings on a common 
issue of law or fact.”129 Invoking the arbitration clause, Volt 
demanded arbitration. 
In view of the incompatibility between the arbitration clause and 
the choice-of-law clause, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the choice-
of-law clause to allow litigation and denied Volt’s motion to compel 
arbitration. The Court reasoned that arbitration parties are free to 
custom design the arbitration clause and may embrace state (civil 
procedure) barriers to arbitration through the choice-of-law clause. 
By specifying the laws of California as the governing law of the 
contract, the Court held that the parties incorporated the rules of the 
California Civil Procedure Code into the arbitration clause. 
The Court relied on the contract theory of arbitration to interpret 
the scope of an arbitration agreement.130 The contract theory of 
arbitration would allow parties to embrace any arbitration barriers 
that a state, such as California, allows. That, however, was not the 
critical question in Volt. The critical question involved a conflict 
analysis between the arbitration clause and the choice-of-law clause. 
These clauses led in different directions: one toward arbitration, the 
other toward litigation. The Court did not consider, let alone resolve, 
the conflicting clauses. By contrast, the dissenting Justices provided 
a piercing analysis of choice-of-law clauses in general and rightfully 
concluded that the parties in Volt did not intend to defeat the 
arbitration clause with a generic, non-state-specific, choice-of-law 
clause preprinted in a form contract.131 
It is common in domestic and international transactions for 
parties to adopt two clauses in an underlying contract: By choosing 
the choice-of-law and the choice-of-forum clauses, parties take 
control of dispute resolution. By adopting these clauses, parties wish 
to avoid the cost and uncertainty associated with the conflict-of-laws 
litigation. The autonomy paradigm enforces both clauses because 
the purpose of the arbitration clause is to provide the forum, whereas 
the purpose of the choice-of-law clause is to identify the law that 
would govern resolution of disputes. Arbitration parties rarely intend 
that the choice-of-law clause nullify the choice-of-forum clause. The 
conflict between the two clauses arises because parties (and their 
lawyers) cannot see all possible consequences flowing from the 
confluence of the two clauses. Most importantly, the choice-of-
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 131. Id. at 488−91 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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arbitration clause is much more specific and purposeful than the 
choice-of-law clause that potentially covers scores of statutes and 
hundreds of cases that may come to bear on substantive dispute 
resolution.132 
If choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses conflict, courts 
need not reward the renegade party who wishes to litigate after a 
dispute has arisen, even though it has specifically agreed to arbitrate. 
Sheltering the renegade party under the choice-of-law clause 
weakens arbitral autonomy and opens yet another escape route from 
arbitration to litigation. The autonomy paradigm, therefore, proposes 
that Volt be revisited and confined to its facts involving non-
arbitration parties. As a general principle, the autonomy paradigm 
proposes that in cases of incompatibility, the choice-of-law clause 
should not be allowed to defeat the arbitration clause. 
VI. PARITY PRINCIPLE 
In granting case management powers necessary to successfully 
conduct and conclude arbitration proceedings, the autonomy 
paradigm proposes a “parity principle” under which the arbitrator 
wields powers in parity with the trial court.133 The “parity principle” 
is a principle of powers granted to the arbitrator; its purpose is not to 
turn arbitration into a mirror image of litigation as the purpose of 
arbitration would be defeated if arbitration mimiced litigation. 
Rather, under the parity principle, the arbitrator is granted the same 
powers of effective case management and disposal as the trial 
court.134 The parity principle is essential to curb arbitral litigation. It 
is already recognized in arbitration law to some extent and should be 
further strengthened in light of the following analysis. 
In understanding the parity principle, one caveat is necessary. 
The parity principle does not dictate that the arbitrator follow 
procedural and evidentiary rules in the same way and to the same 
extent as the trial court. The arbitrator’s procedural powers should 
                                                                                                             
 132. “[T]he inclusion in the contract of a general choice-of-law clause does not 
require application of state law to arbitrability issues, unless it is clear that the 
parties intended state arbitration law to apply on a particular issue.” Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 133. The U.S. Supreme Court used the parity principle in the context of 
banking “to put national banks on the same footing as the banks of the state where 
they were located for all the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States.” Leather Mfrs’ Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887). 
 134. Currently, arbitration does not fully function under the parity principle. 
For example, the arbitrator might not be able to appoint a receiver. Marsch v. 
Williams, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “the power to 
appoint receivers is unique and cannot be extended to arbitrators in the absence of 
legislative action”). 
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not be confused with the procedural rules that govern litigation. The 
rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence provide a complex 
infrastructure to guide litigation. Many of these rules are designed to 
conduct jury trials, something that arbitration does not have.135 
Parties choose arbitration in part to avoid the procedural and 
evidentiary thicket and the attendant cost and delay of litigation. 
Parties “trade[] the procedures . . . for the simplicity, informality, 
and expedition of arbitration.”136 Arbitration would lose efficacy, if 
the arbitrator was obligated to follow procedural and evidentiary 
rules in their entirety.137 In conducting arbitration in a manner 
“appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the 
proceeding,”138the arbitrator enjoys the discretion to select the 
appropriate rules of procedure and evidence. The arbitrator may 
proactively consult parties before the hearing to determine the 
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence. 
The arbitrator’s proactive management of evidence with the 
assistance of parties is a feature unavailable to judges in litigation.139 
A. Preliminary Relief 
The autonomy paradigm proposes two distinct sets of procedural 
powers for the arbitrator. First, the arbitrator must have the authority 
to grant every form of preliminary relief that the trial court may 
permit. Second, the arbitrator must be granted the exclusive power 
to grant preliminary relief, thus eliminating judicial intrusion at the 
initial stages of the arbitration proceedings. The first set of powers 
belongs to the parity principle. The second set is designed to further 
minimize the need to go to court. 
Under the parity principle, the arbitrator, just like the trial judge, 
may grant preliminary relief, such as issuing restraining orders; 
ordering discovery appropriate for the resolution of the controversy; 
issuing subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the 
                                                                                                             
 135. Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury 
Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 444 (1996) (stating that the rules of evidence 
were framed to restrict the information available to jurors in rendering verdicts). 
 136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985). 
 137. “The absence of precise procedural rules is commonly regarded as one of 
the greatest advantages of arbitration in comparison with the mandatory 
procedural rules that govern litigation in national courts.” Giacoma Rojas Elgueta, 
Understanding Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration Through 
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Journey Inside the Minds of Parties and 
Arbitrators, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 174 (2011). 
 138. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 15(a) (amended 2000). 
 139. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra 
note 16, § R-9, R-21, at 14, 18−19. 
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production of documentary and electronic records; and taking action 
against a renegade party “to the extent a court could if the 
controversy were the subject of a civil action.”140 The arbitrator is 
granted these preliminary tools to protect the efficacy and integrity 
of the arbitration process, just as the trial court employs these tools 
for the efficacy and integrity of a civil action. If these tools were 
unavailable to the arbitrator, parties would need to go to court to 
obtain a restraining order, effect discovery, and obtain information 
pertinent to the case—a consequence that defeats the purpose of 
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution.141 
In order to further minimize arbitral litigation, the autonomy 
paradigm proposes that the arbitrator should be the sole dispenser of 
preliminary relief. If a party is granted the option to go either to the 
arbitrator or to the court to seek preliminary relief, there is no 
guarantee which the party will choose. The party may approach the 
court out of convenience or to stall or undermine the arbitration 
proceedings. To minimize arbitral litigation, the option to go to 
court to obtain preliminary relief must be taken away. If the 
renegade party approaches the court to obtain preliminary relief, the 
court should summarily direct the party to seek such relief from the 
arbitrator.142 
While arbitration law recognizes the arbitrator’s power to grant 
preliminary relief, the law does not grant the arbitrator the exclusive 
authority to provide preliminary relief. State and federal courts tend 
to retain the authority to grant relief even if the arbitration 
proceedings are under way and the arbitrator is available to grant the 
necessary relief. In a Georgia case, for example, a party presented 
the exclusivity argument to the Georgia Supreme Court, contending 
that “the parties’ agreement to arbitrate strips this Court of its 
equitable powers to enter injunctive relief.”143 The Georgia Supreme 
Court rejected the exclusivity argument, reminding the party that the 
“overwhelming majority of federal courts . . . have concluded that a 
binding arbitration clause does not bar a plaintiff from seeking 
emergency injunctive relief or other provisional remedies in 
court.”144 Showing annoyance, the Georgia court concluded that the 
                                                                                                             
 140. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17(d) (amended 2000). 
 141. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra 
note 16, § R-34, at 22 (granting the arbitrator the authority to provide interim 
relief). 
 142. The party may even be fined for litigating a dispute that falls under 
arbitration. However, this Article does not fully explore this point. 
 143. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel 
Arbitration at 6, Rose Hall Resort, L.P., v. The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. Of Jam., 
Ltd. No. 09A-08656-7, (Super. Ct. Ga. 2009), 2009 WL 7798803. 
 144. Id. at 7. 
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law in this area is so well-developed that the party’s exclusivity 
argument that “this Court has no authority to award relief of any 
kind borders on the sanctionable.”145 
The Georgia court fused (and possibly confused) emergency 
relief with preliminary relief, ignoring the distinction between them. 
As the discussion in the next Part shows, seeking emergency relief 
before an arbitrator has been appointed is distinguishable from 
seeking preliminary relief after the arbitrator has been appointed. 
The courts need not intervene if the arbitrator is available to grant 
preliminary or emergency relief.146 
B. Emergency Relief 
Even if the law empowers the arbitrator to grant preliminary 
relief, a key structural difference between arbitration and litigation 
challenges the autonomy paradigm. Courts are perennial institutions 
available any time a party needs emergency relief.147 This is not the 
case with arbitration. The arbitration panel, consisting of one or 
more arbitrators conceived in the arbitration agreement, is 
unavailable at the time a dispute arises. Parties frequently provide a 
procedure for appointing the arbitrator. For example, they might 
subscribe to institutional rules for nominating the arbitrator or 
designating an appointing authority who would select the arbitrator. 
Regardless of the procedure provided for the appointment of the 
arbitrator, the appointment occurs after a dispute has arisen and only 
upon the request of a party seeking arbitration. Sometimes, the 
selection of the arbitrator takes time. In many cases, therefore, the 
arbitrator is unavailable when a dispute arises and emergency relief 
is needed. 
The temporality gap between the occurrence of a dispute and 
appointment of the arbitrator forces the party seeking emergency 
relief to go to court. The courts are willing to grant emergency relief 
if “necessary to preserve the status quo and the meaningfulness of 
the arbitration process.”148 In such cases, a court is not obstructing 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. at 8.  
 146. Ira M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration 
Proceedings, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57−58 (noting that some people erroneously 
believe that parties cannot obtain interim relief in arbitration). 
 147. “In important, high-dollar cases, sophisticated parties are sometimes able 
to secure temporary relief in court almost immediately, even at night from a judge 
at home in his or her pajamas.” Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why 
Do Businesses Use (Or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 433, 456 (2010). 
 148. Toyo Tire Holdings of Ams. Inc. v. Cont’l Tire North Am. Inc., 609 F.3d 
975, 981 (2010). 
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or preempting arbitration but stepping in to provide conservatory 
relief without which arbitration might be undermined. The court 
provides emergency relief because there is no arbitrator on board to 
do so. 
The autonomy paradigm, however, can be preserved by closing 
the temporality gap. The parties may construct a mechanism to 
obtain emergency relief before the arbitrator is appointed. They may 
name the arbitrator to provide emergency relief. Judicial 
intervention for emergency relief can be avoided if parties have 
engaged institutional arbitration services and subscribed to special 
institutional rules that provide relief through the appointment of an 
emergency arbitrator.149 In that case, the party approaches the 
institution, and not the court, to obtain emergency relief. Many 
arbitration organizations require parties to specifically adopt 
emergency relief rules.150 
If parties wish to preserve the autonomy paradigm, the 
arbitration agreement needs to include an effective mechanism by 
which an aggrieved party can obtain emergency relief from the 
arbitrator. To minimize arbitral litigation, the autonomy paradigm 
proposes that arbitration organizations integrate emergency relief 
procedures into general institutional rules for arbitration.151 
C. Exemplary Relief 
The autonomy paradigm proposes that the arbitrator have the 
inherent power to grant punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other 
exemplary relief in appropriate cases. If the arbitrator is denied the 
power to grant these remedies, arbitral litigation is inevitable. Parties 
will need to go to court to seek and defend claims of punitive 
                                                                                                             
 149. Mark Kantor, Comparing Expedited Emergency Relief under the 
AAA/ICDR, ICC and LCIA Arbitration Rules, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST 
LITIG. 136 (2006). 
 150. The AAA, for example, requires parties to subscribe to emergency rules, 
which are part of the general rules of arbitration. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION RULES) § R-37 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa 
/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_002008&_afrLoop=19273875
51525279&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=19p48rrgk5_208. A recent case 
shows how emergency relief is sought, granted, and contested. Yahoo v. 
Microsoft, Dist, No. 13 CV 7237, 2013 WL 5708604 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013). 
 151. The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) has adopted emergency 
rules for urgent relief before the arbitrator is appointed; and the SCC emergency 
rules are integrated into the SCC rules for arbitration. ARBITRATION INST. OF THE 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES APP. II at 23 (2010), 
available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedoms 
regler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf. 
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damages and attorney’s fees. As noted above, arbitral litigation adds 
time and cost inefficiencies to dispute resolution. 
Judges use the power to grant punitive damages in select cases 
to deter egregious behavior. “Punitive or exemplary damages have 
been allowed in cases where the wrong complained of is morally 
culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not only 
to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others who 
might  indulge in similar conduct in the future.”152 Even though the 
plaintiff receives punitive damages as a windfall, punitive damages 
serve the social purpose of deterrence, retribution, and possibly 
behavior modification.153 Punitive damages are “a social exemplary 
‘remedy’, [and] not a private compensatory remedy.”154 Their 
imposition is a quasi-criminal sanction.155 
Some courts and commentators argue that arbitrators should not 
be granted the power to award punitive damages.156 A New York 
law specifically prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive 
damages, even if agreed upon by the parties; the power to award 
punitive damages is limited to judicial tribunals.157 These courts and 
scholars believe that because punitive damages are unavailable for 
mere breach of contract, state-appointed judges are best suited to 
determine whether an award of punitive damages would serve the 
public purpose. Private judges, such as arbitrators, who are not 
representing the state, the people, or the rule of law, are hired to do 
justice between the private parties before them; they cannot be 
trusted with a punitive power, the sole purpose of which is to guard 
the welfare of the state and the people.158 
Further, punitive damages granted in litigation are subject to 
judicial and appellate review.159 In litigation, juries are empowered 
                                                                                                             
 152. Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961). 
 153. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
 154. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1976). 
 155. Fabiano v. Philip Morris, Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008). 
 156. For a commentary on the evolution of the debate about punitive damages, 
see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of 
Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 157. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796.  
 158. Id. The court summoned theoretical/jurisprudential insights, citing the 
work of Hans Kelsen, to argue that the state alone has (and should have) a 
monopoly over the exercise of coercive power. Private use of coercion, the court 
concluded, is barbaric. Id. at 796−97. 
 159. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (suggesting that 
excessive punitive damages may violate the Due Process Clause). For a discussion 
of objections to the granting of punitive damages, see Adam M. Gershowitz, The 
Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial 
Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages 
Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249 (2000). 
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to award punitive damages. If lay jurors can award punitive 
damages, one might argue that arbitrators are frequently more 
qualified than lay jurors to understand the rationale and gravity of 
punitive damages. However, there is a difference. The trial court and 
appellate courts may reject a jury award if the basis or the amount of 
punitive damages violates the law. Since judicial review of 
arbitration awards is limited, the argument proceeds, punitive 
damages arbitral awards may not receive the same systematic 
judicial review.160 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that arbitrators are allowed to 
award punitive damages in arbitration cases involving interstate 
commerce.161 Unless arbitration parties exclude the award of 
punitive damages in the arbitration agreement, federal arbitration 
law preempts state restrictions on an arbitrator’s power to award 
punitive damages.162 This ruling, however, is limited in its 
preemptive reach. Parties may still agree to exclude punitive 
damages from arbitration awards, and states may choose to prohibit 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages in cases not involving 
interstate commerce. States, however, might also allow arbitrators to 
grant punitive damages.163 
The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) upholds the parity principle 
and allows the arbitrator to grant punitive damages and other 
exemplary relief if the law would authorize similar damages and 
relief involving the same claim in a civil action.164 To construct 
further symmetry between litigation and arbitration, the Act requires 
that the evidence produced at the arbitration hearing justify the 
award of punitive damages and exemplary relief “under the legal 
standards otherwise applicable to the claim.”165 This symmetrical 
standard allows the arbitrator to grant punitive damages and other 
exemplary relief on par with the court. The arbitrator must consider 
the legal standards and case law of the relevant jurisdiction and 
comply with the choice of law.166  
                                                                                                             
 160. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796. 
 161. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995). 
 162. Id. at 59. 
 163. Gomez v. People’s United Bank, No. 3:10-CV-00904 (CSH), 2012 WL 
3854956 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 2012) (upholding the punitive damages award under 
Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act). 
 164. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) (amended 2000). The Act also allows 
the arbitrator to award attorney’s fees. See id. § 21(b). 
 165. Id. § 21(a). 
 166. The Supreme Court offers three guideposts in awarding punitive damages: 
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity 
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive 
damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by 
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Although parties may preclude an award of punitive damages by 
means of an arbitration agreement, the preclusion raises a red flag. 
Punitive damages preclusions are frequently embedded in take-it-or-
leave-it bargains. In most cases, the weaker party waives punitive 
damages to the benefit of the stronger party that is most likely to 
engage in misconduct warranting punitive damages. Courts are 
reluctant to enforce preclusions on the theory that arbitration is an 
alternative forum to litigation established under the parity 
principle.167 Consequently, the remedies available in litigation ought 
to be available in arbitration. An arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable if it precludes an employee from recovering punitive 
damages and attorney’s fees in an anti-discrimination claim.168 
The parity principle shores up arbitral autonomy. It empowers 
the arbitrator to grant preliminary, emergency, and exemplary relief, 
just as a judge is empowered to provide such relief in litigation. 
Arbitration is unlikely to be a self-sustaining method of dispute 
resolution if courts continue to claim a monopoly over the granting 
of this critical relief when a dispute is designated for arbitration. 
VII. VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS 
The judicial review of arbitration awards poses a systemic threat 
to the autonomy paradigm because it leads to inevitable arbitral 
litigation. A losing party against whom an arbitration award is 
rendered may approach the court to vacate the award or challenge its 
enforcement;169 in either case, the autonomy paradigm ceases to 
exist. Confirming an award is a pro-arbitration action;170 vacating an 
                                                                                                             
 
the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW 
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574−75 (1996). 
 167. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 168. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 
2000). 
 169. One must distinguish between vacating and non-enforcement. When an 
award is vacated, it loses its validity and cannot be enforced. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1688. However, the mere non-enforcement of an 
award does not vacate the award. For example, if a country refuses to enforce a 
foreign award, it is not vacated. The same award may be enforced in another 
country. 
 170. “Confirmation is a summary proceeding that converts a final arbitration 
award into a judgment of the court.” See Ministry of Def. & Support for the 
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 
1091, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). Upon confirmation, an award is treated similarly to 
a judgment in a civil action and may be similarly enforced. Id. 
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award is an anti-arbitration action.171 Vacatur completely nullifies 
the time and expense invested in, and the outcome produced by, the 
arbitration process. Vacatur returns parties back to square one with 
the dispute unresolved. After the vacatur, the parties may attempt to 
arbitrate the dispute one more time, settle, or may resort to litigation, 
depending on why the award was vacated. 
Arbitration law provides a number of grounds upon which a 
court may vacate the award. The FAA, the UAA, the New York 
Convention,172 the Panama Convention, and other treaties all 
provide specific grounds for vacating an award.173 Judges have 
added a few more grounds for vacating awards.174 As a general 
principle, judges respect arbitral outcomes and do not lightly vacate 
arbitration awards. The “‘judicial review of an arbitration award is 
extraordinarily narrow’” and “‘exceedingly deferential.’”175 
Stringent review standards reduce arbitral litigation surrounding the 
enforcement of arbitration awards. Yet the goal of the autonomy 
paradigm is to minimize, and possibly eliminate, the need and desire 
for judicial review of arbitration awards. 
                                                                                                             
 171. The FAA allows three months after the rendering of the award to vacate 
an award but reserves a year for seeking court confirmation of the award. 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 9, 12 (2006) After the passage of three months, a party defending a motion to 
confirm is not allowed to seek vacatur. Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th 
Cir. 1986). 
 172. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), 330 U. N. Treaty Ser. 38. A full discussion 
of the non-enforcement of awards under the Convention is not within the scope of 
this Article. The Convention allows non-enforcement of foreign awards; it does 
not vacate foreign awards. Id. art. V. 
 173. There are regional and global treaties that establish bodies for 
international arbitration. The Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, commonly known as the “Panama Convention,” is a 
regional treaty that provides rules for arbitration in the Americas. The Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration is available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html. The European Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) is another regional arbitration 
treaty. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349. The 1965 Washington Convention is a global treaty that 
has instituted the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
which provides arbitration rules for the settlement of disputes between signatory 
states and foreign investors. The 1965 Washington Convention is available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
 174. Manifest disregard of the law, for example, is a prominent judicially 
created ground for vacating awards. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 175. Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 471−72 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Brook v. Peak Int’l. Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2002) 
and Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v. Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 
2007)).  
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The grounds for vacating the award may be grouped into two 
distinct categories. First, a lawful arbitration award must preserve 
the process integrity of arbitration. The grounds safeguarding the 
process integrity of arbitration are nearly universal. Process integrity 
mandates that an award be vacated if procured by illegal means, 
including corruption and fraud.176 Undue means employed in the 
procurement of an award vitiate the integrity of the arbitration 
process.177 Likewise, the arbitrator’s misconduct that prejudices the 
rights of a party may also compromise the process integrity of 
arbitration. If the neutral arbitrator is evidently partial in favor of a 
party, the arbitration process loses integrity. Even if the arbitrator is 
unbiased, he or she may nonetheless conduct the arbitration hearing 
in a manner that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. For 
example, the integrity of an arbitration hearing is questionable if the 
arbitrator refuses to consider evidence material to the controversy.178 
A substantially defective hearing lacks integrity. Non-arbitrability 
and blatant violations of law, though substantive questions, may also 
undermine the process integrity of arbitration. An award may be 
challenged on the ground that the law (including public policy) 
forbids the arbitration of claims included in the award or that the 
award was rendered in manifest disregard of the law.179 
Second, a lawful arbitration award must preserve the contractual 
integrity of an arbitration agreement. An award may be vacated if 
obtained in violation of the arbitration agreement. “Where 
arbitrators act ‘contrary to express contractual provisions,’ they have 
exceeded their powers.”180 As discussed before, the right and 
                                                                                                             
 176. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (amended 2000); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); 
UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ART. V at 50 (1958), available at http://www.uncitral 
.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf [hereinafter New York 
Convention]. 
 177. “Undue means” is the employment of immoral behavior to procure an 
award. However, meritless arguments made to win an award do not constitute 
undue means. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 
1403−04 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 178. Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 179. “A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award on the basis of a 
violation of public policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine, 
rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate 
law or public policy.” City of Hartford v. Hartford Mun. Emps. Ass’n, 39 A.3d 
1146, 1153 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). The New York Convention specifically 
provides for the non-enforcement of an award if the “subject matter of the 
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of [the 
enforcing] country.” New York Convention, supra note 176, art. V(2)(a), at 50. 
 180. Apache Bohai Corp., 480 F.3d at 401 (quoting Delta Queen Steamboat 
Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng’rs. Beneficial Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th 
Cir. 1989)). 
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obligation to arbitrate chosen disputes are anchored in the arbitration 
contract, a device by which parties surrender the right to litigation in 
favor of arbitration.181 The arbitration agreement defines the scope 
of arbitration and empowers the arbitrator to render an award. 
Logically, therefore, an award cannot be enforced if there was no 
agreement to arbitrate. In the absence of a valid arbitration 
agreement, the award-holder had no right to arbitration in the first 
place.182 Under a similar logic, an award is vacated if the arbitrator 
exceeded the powers that the agreement conferred on the arbitrator. 
For example, the arbitrator cannot render an enforceable award with 
respect to a claim that parties have excluded from the scope of 
arbitration. 
Note, however, that arbitration law does not require judicial 
confirmation or review of arbitration awards. If an award is accepted 
and voluntarily enforced, no judicial confirmation is needed, and the 
autonomy paradigm remains intact.183 However, a party seeks court 
confirmation of an award only when the award is likely to remain 
unsatisfied. Likewise, an unhappy losing party may not comply with 
the award and seek judicial review for its vacatur. 
The availability of judicial review of arbitral awards cannot be 
abandoned to fortify the autonomy paradigm. However, the 
autonomy paradigm can be preserved by shifting the award review 
from courts to arbitration organizations. Already, arbitration 
organizations provide appellate award review on the same grounds 
available to courts.184 Once the parties have used the organizational 
appellate review of an award, any further review by a court should 
be foreclosed. This foreclosure is necessary to deter parties from 
seeking court intervention after the organizational appellate review 
is complete; otherwise, the organizational appellate review will turn 
into an additional, and perhaps unnecessary, layer in the 
enforcement of awards. 
                                                                                                             
 181. See supra Part II. 
 182. However, this ground is unavailable if the party denying the arbitration 
agreement does not object to the arbitration proceeding in a timely fashion. UNIF. 
ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(5) (amended 2000).  
 183. However, if the losing party does not accept the award or refuses to 
comply, the arbitral award needs to be enforced through a court; arbitral awards 
are not self-enforcing. See Thomas S. Meriwether, Limiting Judicial Review of 
Arbitral Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 739, 743−44 (2007). 
 184. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra 
note 16, at 36. 
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VIII. ARBITRATION BLACKOUT 
Does arbitral autonomy breed a counterculture of quasi-
lawlessness shrouded in secrecy, disregard of the law, preclusions of 
remedies, and waivers of rights? The general answer is no. In some 
cases, however, arbitral autonomy may lead to a quasi-lawless 
blackout. Consider a MAC embedded in a take-it-or-leave-it 
bargain. In such a bargain, the weaker party has no negotiating 
power to modify any feature of the MAC.185 The MAC might waive 
class action, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. The MAC might 
further state that arbitration proceedings will be confidential and that 
the arbitrator need not render a reasoned award. Added to these 
features are the limited statutory grounds available to vacate an 
award rendered in secrecy without reasons. Although each provision 
of the MAC is lawful, the combined effect of the provisions 
produces quasi-lawlessness that hides in the fold of secrecy without 
arbitral accountability, systemic deterrence, or meaningful judicial 
scrutiny. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld take-it-or-leave-it bargains 
mandating arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution 
despite a compelling dissenting voice.186 This judicial concession in 
favor of MACs must not be construed to conclude that the Court has 
also discarded or weakened the doctrine of unconscionability. State 
and federal courts analyze MACs in terms of unconscionability.187 
They administer a two-tier analysis.188 First, they determine whether 
an arbitration contract is procedurally unfair.189 Second, they 
determine whether the substantive bargain of the arbitration contract 
is unfair.190 The courts hold arbitration contracts unconscionable 
only if the combined procedural and substantive unfairness is 
oppressive.191 Under this analysis, take-it-or-leave-it arbitration 
clauses are procedurally unfair because one party imposes 
arbitration on the other.192 However, the court would find no 
                                                                                                             
 185. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of 
Power in Legal Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and 
Arbitration), 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 120−122 (1997) for an explanation of 
power relation in unconscionable bargains. 
 186. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 676 (2012) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
 187. See, e.g., Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 188. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 
690 (Cal. 2000) (analyzing unconscionability in terms of procedural and 
substantive portions). 
 189. See, e.g., id. 
 190. See, e.g., id. 
 191. See, e.g., id. at 689. 
 192. See id. at 690–92. 
2013] ARBITRAL AUTONOMY 47 
 
 
 
unconscionability if the terms of the arbitration are fair. In 
procedurally coercive arbitration contracts, therefore, the critical 
question is to assess the substantive fairness of the arbitration terms. 
The academic literature is divided over the issue. Some academics 
criticize MACs in consumer and employment contracts.193 Others 
argue that MACs benefit consumers and employees.194 
Another genre of MACs tends to circumvent rights and remedies 
available in litigation. For example, an arbitration agreement may 
shorten the statute of limitations for filing claims; another may limit 
the amount of damages to actual damages for breach of contract; 
and yet another may waive federal statutory remedies.195 Such 
arbitration agreements are coercive in nature because no rational 
party would willingly surrender the rights and remedies available in 
litigation. A party with superior bargaining power cannot, therefore, 
be allowed to use arbitration autonomy to unfairly tilt the playing 
field in its own favor, dramatically reduce its legal obligations, and 
deprive the weaker party of the rights and remedies that law 
guarantees in a civil action.196 
Despite endorsing the lawfulness of MACs, courts are reluctant 
to endorse class action waivers. The enforceability of class action 
waivers appears to be a special matter that courts mull over with 
extensive analytical anguish.197 Courts point out that class action 
lawsuits are indispensable for vindicating statutory rights.198 Class 
action “is the only economically rational alternative when a large 
group of individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong, but 
the damages due to any single individual or entity are too small to 
justify bringing an individual action.”199 Courts do not wish to 
completely outlaw class action waivers, but they want to retain the 
authority to analyze and rule upon each waiver on its own merit.200 
Class action waivers, therefore, will continue to spawn arbitral 
litigation. 
                                                                                                             
 193. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1283−1316 (2009). 
 194. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment 
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 
1578−81 (2005). 
 195. Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., a Div. of Atl. Richfield Co., 43 F.3d 
1244, 1248−49 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding such clauses to be unenforceable), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995). 
 196. This type of arbitration agreement breaches the parity principle discussed 
in Part VI of this Article. 
 197. Compare AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), 
with In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 198. In re Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 214. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 219. 
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Critics of arbitration highlight points of contrast between 
litigation and arbitration.201 Litigation is open and accessible to the 
public; arbitration is frequently confidential, and its records are 
unavailable to the public. Litigation produces judicial opinions 
justifying orders and judgments; arbitration renders standard awards 
without supportive rationale. Published judicial opinions make 
litigation intellectually transparent; unpublished arbitration awards 
make arbitration relatively opaque. Judicialization of dispute 
resolution generates legal precedents that are binding in similar 
cases; arbitration rarely offers or relies on binding precedents. Most 
importantly, the law is closely applied in litigation, and appellate 
courts overturn lower court judgments resting on violations of law 
or abuse of judicial discretion. No such safeguards are available in 
arbitration where awards cannot be vacated for erroneous 
understandings or interpretations of statutes and cases. Errors of law 
may proliferate in an arbitration blackout where arbitrators are not 
lawyers. 
The arbitration blackout would joyously embrace the arbitral 
autonomy presented in this Article, which minimizes court 
intervention in arbitration. MACs peppered with preclusion of 
remedies and waivers of rights would draw strength from the 
autonomy paradigm that restrains court scrutiny. Businesses and 
employers, in forcing arbitration on consumers and employees, 
would welcome arbitral autonomy that promises even less judicial 
oversight than currently available. The autonomy paradigm does not 
benefit persons desperately looking for jobs, who have little 
negotiating power to modify boilerplate arbitration clauses 
embedded in employment contracts. If the autonomy paradigm is a 
force of good, it cannot be permitted to favor the powerful and the 
privileged and hurt the weak and the vulnerable.202 The following 
                                                                                                             
 201. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: 
Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1420, 1432 (2008) (noting the opposition of state courts to expanding 
arbitration beyond commercial disputes). 
 202. Professor Thomas Stipanowich proposes the establishment of “The 
Arbitration Fairness Index” to promote fair and effective arbitration of 
employment and consumer disputes. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration 
Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and 
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer 
Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012).  
Given the fact that binding arbitration serves as the adjudicative backdrop 
for consumer disputes or employer-employee conflict, the choice of 
arbitration and the kind of justice available under arbitration agreements 
may be every bit as important as consumer warranties and other 
substantive rights and remedies set forth in the contract.  
Id. at 1069. 
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corrective measures are necessary to ensure that arbitral autonomy 
does not support an arbitration blackout. 
A. Arbitration Secrecy 
The arbitration blackout is pro-secrecy. Companies and 
employers prefer confidential arbitration. Secrecy allows businesses 
to avoid adverse publicity associated with embarrassing 
discriminating treatments against which employees seek relief. 
Secrecy “diminishes the likelihood that the success of one claim by 
a consumer or employee will encourage others like it.”203 Defenders 
of arbitration confidentiality, however, point out that even 
mediations and negotiated settlements are confidential.204 
Arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution might lose 
some of its appeal, defenders argue, if arbitration confidentiality is 
restricted or outlawed.205 Some scholars distinguish between privacy 
and secrecy, though the distinction is elusive;206 but even if there is a 
conceptual distinction, arbitration rules may preempt the distinction 
requiring that arbitration deliberations be both private and secret.207 
Certainly, there are degrees of secrecy, some benign, others 
unconscionable. The autonomy paradigm does not protect 
unconscionable secrecy that harms the public interest; it allows 
confidential arbitration in some but not all cases. The purpose of the 
autonomy paradigm is to minimize court intervention and not to 
maximize the secrecy of arbitration proceedings. Secrecy is not an 
indispensable attribute of arbitral autonomy. If arbitration secrecy is 
harmful to the public interest, the autonomy paradigm should 
                                                                                                             
 203. Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The “National Policy” of the 
Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L. J. 259, 283 (2003). 
 204. Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public: Diminishing Privacy in Dispute 
Resolution in the Internet Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 47 (2002). 
 205. Id. 
 206. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 417−18 (2002) (distinguishing between privacy and confidentiality). 
For example, arbitration proceedings are conducted in privacy, but the information 
is released after the proceedings are concluded. In such cases, the arbitration 
proceedings are private but not secret. It is, however, likely that not all information 
is released to the public. Privacy thus acts as a forerunner of secrecy. 
 207. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (ARBITRATION 
RULES) ART 15 (1), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles 
/basicdoc/partF-chap02.htm. “The deliberation of the Tribunal shall take place in 
private and remain secret.” Id.  
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require that arbitration proceedings be open and arbitration records 
and outcomes be made public.208 
Arbitration secrecy is unconscionable when it exclusively 
benefits one arbitration party and hurts the other. In Ting v. AT&T, 
for example, the Consumer Services Agreement (CSA), an adhesion 
contract that AT&T offered its customers, restricted numerous rights 
and remedies in the event of a dispute with AT&T.209 The CSA 
mandated secret arbitration; it banned class actions, and it limited 
AT&T’s liability for non-negligence claims to the amount of service 
charges and precluded the company’s liability for punitive, reliance, 
special, and consequential damages. The CSA reserved benefits for 
AT&T and burdened the consumers. In view of this imbalance, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the secrecy 
provisions of the CSA were unconscionable.210 
The Ting court noted more broadly that secrecy provisions, 
though facially neutral, favor companies rather than individuals.211 
Companies, as repeat players in arbitration, accumulate a body of 
knowledge unavailable to consumer–plaintiffs due to arbitration 
secrecy.212 As repeat players, companies master the issues, develop 
winning arguments, and know what works, all which is unknown to 
new plaintiffs who might request arbitration for similar grievances. 
The court noted “the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent 
potential plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed to build a 
case of intentional misconduct or unlawful discrimination against 
[the company].”213 Thus, secrecy provisions included in arbitration 
agreements “gag” critical information from reaching future 
plaintiffs, tilting arbitration in favor of companies.214 
With respect to secrecy provisions, the autonomy paradigm 
proposes the parity principle under which arbitration may be 
confidential to the extent a civil action involving the same issues 
protects confidentiality. For example, a company may shield trade 
secrets from disclosure. The Supreme Court has treated confidential 
                                                                                                             
 208. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. 
KAN. L. R. 1211, 1238−40 (2006) (arguing for public disclosure of arbitration 
proceedings involving public health, public safety, and other public concerns). 
 209. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 210. Id. at 1151−52. 
 211. Id. 
 212. One court articulated the repeat player effect with the following 
observation: “The fact an employer repeatedly appears before the same group of 
arbitrators conveys distinct advantages over the individual employee. These 
advantages include knowledge of the arbitrators’ temperaments, procedural 
preferences, styles and the like . . . .” Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
671, 678−79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 213. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152. 
 214. Id.  
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business information, including trade secrets, as private property 
that cannot be converted into public property through forced 
disclosure.215 Likewise, privileged information recognized in civil 
actions may be similarly protected in arbitration proceedings. 
However, companies cannot use arbitration to shield patterns of 
wrongdoing that they cannot protect in litigation. A cloak of 
confidentiality in all aspects of arbitration should rarely be available. 
B. Quasi-lawlessness 
The arbitration blackout nurtures quasi-lawlessness. As noted 
earlier, arbitration awards cannot be vacated for erroneous 
applications or interpretations of law. Legal error as a ground for 
vacatur is not listed in the FAA or the UAA.216 Legal error is 
tolerated because arbitrators, while they bring valuable trade-related 
expertise to dispute resolution, may not be trained in law or 
adjudication. In choosing arbitration, parties risk that the arbitrator 
might misunderstand and misinterpret the applicable law. Vacating 
awards for legal errors would undermine arbitration as an alternative 
method of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court has further 
foreclosed legal error as a ground for vacatur, holding that 
arbitration parties cannot, by means of a contract, expand the 
statutory scope of judicial review to include legal errors.217 
Some courts vacate arbitration awards rendered in manifest 
disregard of the law, a non-statutory standard of judicial review.218 
In 1953, the Supreme Court invented the manifest-disregard-of-law 
standard, declaring “that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in 
accordance with [the law or] . . . the interpretations of the law by . . . 
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the 
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”219 The 
standard opposes the arbitration blackout of rendering legally 
vacuous decisions. However, the manifest-disregard-of-law standard 
sets a high bar; it “means something more than just an error in the 
law or a failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply 
                                                                                                             
 215. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 216. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000). 
 217. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2010). 
 218. Circuits are split over whether the manifest-disregard-of-law ground is 
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the law.”220 The standard is met only if the arbitrator understands the 
law and yet renders a decision contrary to it. The “manifest” part of 
the standard obliges the party challenging the award to show that the 
disregard of law is more than mere legal error. In some cases, the 
reasoning of the award might itself reveal the manifest disregard of 
the law;221 while in other cases, the arbitrator’s conduct during the 
arbitration proceedings might evidence the arbitrator’s intentional 
dismissal of the law.222 
The autonomy paradigm supports manifest disregard of the law 
as a valid standard for vacating arbitration awards rendered under 
MACs; thus, it suppresses the blackout that enforces the MACs’ 
arbitration awards regardless of their compliance with the law.223 
The MACs’ weaker parties rarely bargain for arbitration to avoid the 
applicable law. Almost always, arbitration agreements contain 
choice-of-law clauses that govern in resolving substantive issues.224 
The standard may or may not be useful in vacating awards related to 
freely negotiated arbitration clauses between sophisticated parties. 
The manifest-disregard-of-law standard is most beneficial to review 
awards rendered under MACs where the weaker party does not 
negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement. In MACs, if the 
weaker party fails to prevail in arbitration, it needs to know the legal 
reasons for the arbitral decision. However, the standard is 
meaningful only if arbitrators write reasoned opinions supporting 
awards. 
C. Reasonless Awards 
The arbitration blackout prospers when arbitrators fail to render 
reasoned awards.225 Standard arbitration awards are reasonless 
awards; they simply announce the result without providing 
supportive reasoning.226 Reasonless awards, if made public, have no 
                                                                                                             
 220. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 
1995). 
 221. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 222. Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641 
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d at 832). 
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 225. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
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 226. Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 844 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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informational or precedential value. Arbitration parties themselves 
may not know why they have lost or won their competing claims. 
An arbitral decision is transparent when it is rendered in writing and 
includes supportive reasons. If no reasoning is provided and the 
award simply states that, say, the defendant is liable for a certain 
amount of money with interest, parties and courts alike cannot 
determine which facts, law, or legal analysis the arbitrator relied on 
to reach the award.227 This minimalist methodology of rendering 
bare awards without giving supportive analysis is in sharp contrast 
to adjudication in which judicial decisions furnish the facts, 
applicable law, and legal reasoning, including the public policy, 
supporting the judgment. 
Institutional rules designed for arbitration may or may not 
support decisional transparency. Most institutions allow arbitration 
parties to opt out of reasoned awards. The AAA arbitration rules do 
not require that the arbitrator “render a reasoned award.”228 The 
arbitrator can deliver the award in writing but without furnishing the 
facts or law or other reasons that support the award. The London 
Court of International Arbitration Rules furnish a default rule under 
which the arbitrator states the reasons upon which the award is 
based.229 However, arbitration parties may change the default rule 
by agreeing otherwise in writing.230 The International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) Rules, however, require that the arbitrator state the 
reasons upon which the award is based.231 There is nothing in the 
ICC rules under which arbitration parties may modify the rule and 
opt for an award without supportive analysis. 
Unlike judicial opinions, reasoned awards may be written in a 
variety of ways.232 A standard judicial opinion contains key facts, 
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issues, relevant law, legal analysis (parties’ arguments accepted and 
parties’ arguments rejected), and the order or judgment. Some 
opinions are more elaborate than others. Reasoned arbitration 
awards may be written following the format of a standard judicial 
opinion.233 Mostly, they are not.234 The amount of explanation 
offered in reasoned awards may vary from a short analysis to 
detailed “findings of facts and conclusions of law.”235 However, 
courts, reluctant to recognize new grounds for vacatur, refuse to 
vacate awards merely because the arbitrator’s explanation 
supporting the award is substandard.236 
The autonomy paradigm embraces the ICC rule that requires 
arbitrators to render reasoned awards in cases founded on MACs. 
Parties may request that the arbitrator provide the explanation of 
facts and law critical to the rendering of the award. 237 The rendered 
award, however, may not meet the analytical standards of a good 
judicial opinion. The autonomy paradigm, which strives to minimize 
court intervention at all stages of arbitration, opposes vacating 
awards for inadequate supportive analysis. 
What good is the reasoned award, one might ask, if the quality of 
supportive analysis is immune from judicial review? Reasoned 
awards provide numerous benefits other than the basis for judicial 
review. Reasoned awards reflect the arbitrator’s expertise and ability, 
enabling future arbitration parties to make more informed decisions in 
hiring arbitrators.238 Reasoned awards may provide reliable clues on 
whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers or engaged in 
manifest disregard of the law. If reasoned awards’ supportive analyses 
are regularly substandard, arbitration organizations may face market 
accountability. The market pressure may force arbitration 
                                                                                                             
 
explanation and findings of fact and conclusions of law requiring the 
most.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. (“Generally, an arbitrator need not explain her decision; thus, in a 
typical arbitration where no specific form of award is requested, arbitrators may 
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 235. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law 
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 
117, 118–19 (1998) (stating that reasoned awards build public confidence in 
arbitration). 
 238. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial 
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 501 (1998) (suggesting that 
the parties should be vigilant on the front end to obtain credible reasoned awards 
rather than relying on the judicial safety net of vacatur). 
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organizations to train arbitrators in writing more effectively reasoned 
awards. The availability of published reasoned awards, like that of 
judicial opinions, will establish arbitration jurisprudence providing 
informative guidance in future cases.239 Judges too may benefit from 
reading reasoned awards in cases where arbitrators have trade-specific 
expertise that judges do not have.240 
D. Pro-arbitration Exuberance 
State skepticism of arbitration makes most sense with respect to 
MACs embedded in take-it-or-leave-it bargains. State legislatures 
make rational and moral choices when they pass legislation to 
protect consumers against corporate misconduct. For example, 
businesses disfavor class action lawsuits. Ordinarily, consumers, 
while buying goods and services, retain the right to a class action 
lawsuit. Businesses, however, may be unwilling to do business 
unless consumers sign arbitration agreements and waive class 
actions.241 Thus arbitration has become a business tool to 
circumvent class actions.242 A state legislature does no wrong if it 
outlaws class action waivers in arbitration agreements.243 This 
legislative choice reflects the reality of markets in which consumers 
do not freely sign class action waivers. The state legislature has 
every right, indeed a duty, to correct market conduct that 
undermines consumer rights. 
Pro-business judges use preemptive power under the FAA to 
provide relief to businesses that cannot be obtained from state 
legislatures.244 Businesses wield money and influence in democratic 
processes at both federal and state levels.245 Business lobbies may 
petition a state legislature against present and future barriers to 
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arbitration.246 If the legislature, despite lobbying, retains an old 
barrier or enacts a new barrier to arbitration, the legislative action 
embodies the will of the people of the state. Pro-business federal 
judges should respect state arbitration policy choices.247 They 
should not grant businesses an arbitration favor that the state 
legislature has denied.248 Nor should they use the power of 
preemption to dismantle “hundreds of state common law claims” 
and regulations made to protect “consumers and workers against 
corporate misconduct.”249 It is ironic that conservative judges, 
otherwise vociferous defenders of states’ rights, abandon their 
ideology of states’ rights in arbitration. 
The autonomy paradigm views pro-arbitration exuberance with 
caution and skepticism. Pro-business federal judges, enamored with 
arbitration, are predisposed to strike down state barriers to 
arbitration under the now worn-out slogan that state barriers are 
vestiges of “judicial prejudice against arbitration.”250 Surely, 
centuries ago, common law courts were reluctant to enforce pre-
dispute arbitration agreements. There is a difference, however, 
between the so-called “historical prejudice” of common law judges 
and the rational policy choices that elected state legislatures make 
after due democratic deliberations. To protect consumers and 
employees, state legislatures may exclude certain matters from the 
scope of arbitration. Federal courts need to be careful, if not 
reluctant, in preempting state legislation that refuses to ride the pro-
business arbitration bandwagon. 
The autonomy paradigm endorses congressional efforts to 
oppose the unconscionability of MACs.251 State judges can also 
undertake a more aggressive approach to reviewing MACs for their 
compliance with fairness and freedom of contract. If pro-business 
federal judges do not dampen their pro-arbitration exuberance in 
upholding MACs, they will further entrench the arbitration blackout 
of quasi-lawlessness.252 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The autonomy of arbitration proposed in this Article minimizes 
court intervention into arbitration proceedings and outcomes. 
Arbitration’s efficacy as an alternative method of dispute resolution 
is dramatically increased when the arbitrator enjoys the same 
powers as the trial judge in litigation. Arbitration law recognizes the 
arbitrator’s procedural powers to order discovery, issue injunctions, 
and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, etc.253 The law 
also recognizes the arbitrator’s powers to grant punitive damages, 
attorney’s fees, and other forms of exemplary relief.254 In order to 
further fortify the autonomy paradigm, parties should authorize the 
arbitrator to decide questions of the existence, validity, and 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including questions of 
arbitrability arising under fractional arbitration.255 Parties should 
subscribe to the emergency procedures of an arbitration organization 
to eliminate the need to go to court to obtain relief before the 
arbitrator is selected.256 Likewise, parties should opt for the 
appellate procedures of an arbitration organization to review the 
legality and enforceability of an arbitration award.257 Under the 
combined powers of arbitration law and arbitration agreements, 
arbitral litigation can be minimized. 
Arbitral autonomy refuses to support an arbitration blackout that 
promotes deviations from legal values critical to the maintenance of 
fairness and justice.258 Specifically, MACs threaten the integrity and 
morality of arbitral autonomy.259 These clauses are embedded in 
take-it-or-leave-it bargains to undermine the right to class actions, 
punitive damages, and other remedies.260 MACs, coupled with 
arbitration secrecy and lack of reasoned awards, establish a regime 
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of dispute resolution detrimental to arbitral autonomy.261 If MACs 
are made immune from judicial scrutiny, arbitral autonomy will be 
disparaged as a jurisprudential construct that favors corporate 
interests, hides corporate misconduct, and harms the weak and the 
vulnerable.262 
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